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I. SYNOPSIS
The statutory standard for determining whether state and local
government employers have discriminated differs from the constitutional
standard. Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,1 as amended in
1972 to extend to government employers, proof of discriminatory impact
suffices; 2 under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to
the United States Constitution,3 proof of discriminatory purpose is
required.4 This difference has been challenged by state and local
government employers as unconstitutional.5
The heart of the challenge is that the meaning of a constitutional
provision may not vary depending upon whether legislators or judges are
the interpreters.6 This term, in City of Rome v. United States,7 the
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i. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e, et seq. (Supp. 1979). Statutory liability for state and local government
employment practices may conceivably be predicated on various federal statutes, their implementing
regulations, and executive orders. See, e.g., Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972,20 U.S.C.
§ 1681, et seq. (1976); Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967,29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq. (1976); Rehabilitation Act of 1973,29 U.S.C. §§ 793,
794 (1976); State and Local Financial Assistance (Revenue Sharing) Act of 1972, 31 U.S.C. § 1221
(1976); Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976); Civil Rights Act of 1871,42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1976); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq. (1976); Executive Order
11,246.3 C.F.R. 169-77 (1974); Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. §
1607 (1979). Those practices are usually also subject to state laws and sometimes to local ordinances.
The focus of this Article will be on Title VII because it presents in starkest relief constitutional
problems of statutory liability for discriminatory impact.
2. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
3. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I: "[N]or shall any State . . . deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
4. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
5. Although challenges are now working their way through federal appellate courts, see cases
cited in note 13 infra, the United States Supreme Court has not yet had this issue properly before it.
County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 635-36 n.* (1979) (Steward, J., dissenting); Hazelwood
School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,306 n.12 (1977); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,323
n.l (1977). Cf. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 n.11 (1976) ("[R]espondents do not contend that
the substantive provisions of Title VII as applied here are not a proper exercise of congressional
authority under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.")
6. After Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), a majority of Supreme Court Justices can be
counted in support of the proposition that the "normative content of a constitutional provision is the
same for both Congress and the Court"; consequently, the impact standard under Title VII and the
holding in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), conflict as to state and local government
employers: "Only one of the two theories- Washington or [impact under Title VII--can prevail, for
the two are mutually exclusive." Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimina-
tion, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 573 n.148 (1977). My colleague is right; the two are mutually exclusive.
His analysis deflates Washington v. Davis, but I do not foresee its reversal any time soon. Thus, my
analysis proceeds to reconcile a seemingly irreconcilable conflict by positing a commerce clause
anchor.
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Supreme Court of the United States upheld a discriminatory impact
standard in the Voting Rights Act' and rejected an argument that, because
the constitutional provision 9 that Congress was enforcing reached only
purposeful discrimination,'0 congressional enforcement power was so
limited:
It is clear, then, that under § 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment Congress
may prohibit practices that in and of themselves do not violate § I of the
Amendment, so long as the prohibitions attacking racial discrimination in
voting are "appropriate," . . . In the present case, we hold that the Act's ban
on electoral changes that are discriminatory in effect is an appropriate
method of promoting the purposes of the Fifteenth Amendment, even if it is
assumed that § 1 of the Amendment prohibits only intentional discrimination
in voting."
Although City of Rome involved the fifteenth amendment while the
challenge to Title ViI's discriminatory impact standard involves the
fourteenth amendment, City of Rome used fourteenth amendment
precedent to buttress an expansive reading of the fifteenth amendment.1
2
Prior to City of Rome, courts and commentators faced with a direct
fourteenth amendment challenge to Title VII have rejected the challenge,
but their reasoning has been facile.' 3 This Article distinguishes City of
Rome, criticizes that reasoning, and then shows why differing standards
are nevertheless constitutional.
The challenge relies on a pat argument: (1) application of Title VII to
state and local governments represents an exercise of congressional power
to enforce the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment; 4 (2)
7. 100 S. Ct. 1548 (1980).
8. Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1976) ("[S]uch qualification,
prerequisite, standard, practice, or procedure does not have the purpose and will not have the effect of
denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.")
9. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I: "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude."
10. In City of Rome, the Court assumed that the fifteenth amendment "prohibits only
purposeful discrimination," 100 S. Ct. at 1560 (footnote omitted). Justice Marshall dropped a
footnote, id. at n. 1I, disclaiming reliance on City of Mobile v. Bolden, 100 S. Ct. 1490 (1980), a decision
from which he dissented, 100 S. Ct. at 1520, in which a plurality of fourjustices approved"the principle
that racially discriminatory motivation is a necessary ingredient of a Fifteenth Amendment violation."
100 S. Ct. at 1497. Enforcement power flows from section two of the fifteenth amendment: "The
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation." U.S. CONsT. amend. XV.
§ 2.
11. City of Rome v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1548, 1562 (1980).
12. Id. at 1561-62.
13. See, e.g., Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671, 689 n.7 (6th Cir. 1979); Scott
v. City of Anniston, Ala., 597 F.2d 897, 899 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3154
(U.S. Sept. 7, 1979); Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1979), petition for
cert. filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3013 (U.S. R%1j, 12, 1979); Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Fade
Case in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 25-27 (1979);
Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Race
Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 207,224 n.94 (1979); Comment, United
States v. City of Chicago: Impact Standard Applicable to State and Local Governments under 7itle
VII, 20 WM. & MARY L. REV. 357, 383-87 (1978).
14. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 5: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate
legislation, the provisions of this article."
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enforcing the equal protection clause means compelling observance of its
dictate; (3) the equal protection clause dictates that government
employment practices not be adopted or administered with a dis-
criminatory purpose; (4) Title VII may not reach beyond its constitutional
power source; and (5) Title VII, therefore, may not proscribe, under the
guise of enforcing the fourteenth amendment, government employment
practices that have a discriminatory impact but not a discriminatory
purpose.
Such a pat argument invites rejection. The fallacies are found in
premises (2) and (3). These premises are acceptable as far as they go. The
rejectionists explain, however, that the analytical journey to a con-
stitutional justification for differing standards is not so short. Premise (2)
stops at one aspect of enforcement, the proscription. Enforcement also
involves a remedy. As part of the remedy for a denial of equal protection,
Congress could set a. lower standard of proof. Premise (3) stops at the
beginning. The judicial definition of the equal protection clause dictate is
acceptable as a starting point, but a congressionally contrived definition
also belongs to the constitutional lexicon. 5
The rejectionists take what appears to be a shortcut. A longer route
proceeds through the commerce clause 16 but includes a speed trap: the
holding in National League of Cities v. Usery17 that federal minimum wage
and maximum hours regulation may not be applied to state and local
employers because the tenth amendment" imposes a federalism limit on
commerce clause power. The shortcut is provided by Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer,'9 in which the Court held that the attorney's fees provision of Title
VII may be applied to state and local employers because the 1972
amendment" extending Title VII to those employers represents an
exercise of fourteenth amendment, not commerce clause, enforcement
power.
The rejectionists' criticism of both premises is acceptable, but their
conclusion is equally fallacious. While premise (2) ignores congressional
power to supply a remedy for a violation of the equal protection clause,
that power does not extend to a substantive alteration of what the clause
means. And, while premise (3) ignores congressional lexography, the role
Congress may play in defining violations of the equal protection clause is
conditioned on the Supreme Court leaving room in the clause for a
consistent interpretation. Katzenbach v. Morgan2' does not hold
15. Katzenbach v. Morgan. 384 U.S. 641,650-51 (1966), is universally cited by rejectionists in
support of their criticism of both pronounced fallacies.
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c. 3: "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce . . . among
the several States ...-
17. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. X: "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
19. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
20. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972).
21. Kat7enbach v. Morgan. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
1980]
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otherwise; instead, the section 5 power of Congress to enforce the
fourteenth amendment is subject to the principle of judicial review:
Congress may not adopt a meaning of the equal protection clause that the
22Supreme Court has rejected. The shortcut becomes a dead end, the
longer route more attractive.
The federalism limit established by National League is satisfied by
Title VII and similar antidiscrimination statutes. 3 These laws do not
intrude in the same way as the regulations in National League; therefore,
the balancing done to apply the federalism limit tilts in favor of the laws.
Congress has plenary power under the commerce clause24 and may
determine that commerce is affected by state and local government
employer practices that have a discriminatory impact. Consequently, Title
VII, snugly anchored in the commerce clause, may base liability upon a
standard different from the constitutional one.
II. CITY OF ROME
On a superficial level, City of Rome destroys the challenge of state and
local employers to statutory discriminatory impact liability. If Congress
may establish impact liability under the fifteenth amendment, which has
been assumed to require purposeful discrimination to prove a con-
stitutional violation, then Congress surely can do likewise under the
fourteenth amendment. Any challenge to Title VII now must circumvent
City of Rome; yet, both the rationale and the language of the decision seem
controlling.
City of Rome is distinguishable, however, on two points: first, the
context of the holding is tightly linked to historic purposeful discrimina-
tion; and second, the congressional findings underlying the Voting Rights
Act differ in kind and degree from thosejustifying extension of Title VII to
state and local employers. Even if the rationale and language in City of
Rome are insufficiently distinguishable, its holding controls only fifteenth
amendment challenges, and the references to fourteenth amendment
precedent are too easily dismissed as dicta to diminish the contrast between
constitutional and statutory liability standards for state and local
21governmental employers.
22. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
23. Analysis of commerce clause power in the area of employment discrimination has largely
focused on the Equal Pay Act of 1963,29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976). See, e.g., Pearce v. Wichita Cty. Hosp.
Bd., 590 F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1979); Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1979). The
analysis is, however, apposite.
24. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196-97 (1824).
25. Both amendments protect against "racial voter dilution," City of Mobile v. Bolden. 100 S.
Ct. 1490, 1500 (1980), however, their language differs in a significant way. The fifteenth amendment
goes beyond denial of a right to proscribe abridgment as well. Id. at 1533, 1536 (Marshall, J..
dissenting). Under the plurality in Bolden, "the necessity of showing purposeful discrimination in order
to show a Fifteenth Amendment violation" applies to both denial and abridgment of the franchise. Id.
at 1498. But, abridgment can be accomplished by "a political structure that treats all individuals as
[Vol. 41:301
1980] DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT LIABILITY
On the first point, the congressional determination that a dis-
criminatory impact standard was an appropriate way to enforce the
fifteenth amendment won judicial approval in City of Rome due to the
context of prior purposeful discrimination. "Congress could rationally
have concluded that, because electoral changes by jurisdictions with a
demonstrable history of intentional racial discrimination in voting create
the risk of purposeful discrimination, it was proper to prohibit changes
that have a discriminatory impact., 26 This approval more closely
resembles an "impact-plus" standard, approved by fourteenth amendment
precedent as consistent with the constitutional purpose standard, 27 than a
pure impact one. The distinction is especially important when prior
unconstitutional activity, presumed by the Voting Rights Act as to cities in
Georgia, is to be remedied.28
On the second point, the majority in City of Rome starkly
characterized the challenge there: "The appellants are asking us to do
nothing less than overrule our decision in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,
383 U.S. 301 (1966), in which we upheld the constitutionality of the Act. 2
9
In denying that request, the Court relied on congressional findings, first
approved in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, of "unremitting and ingenious
defiance of the Constitution," which produced seemingly neutral voting
practices that were but slightly camouflaged means of intentional
discrimination. 0
In part IV of this Article, the legislative history of the 1972
amendments to Title VII is plumbed, 31 and the relationship of prior
equals but adversely affects the political strength of a racially identifiable group." Id. at 1509 (Stevens,
J.. concurring). In this sense, equal treatment under the fourteenth amendment would not prevent a
violation of the fifteenth amendment. If the term "abridge" is to have a meaning additional to that of
"deny." then City of Rome may be distinguishable.
26. City of Romev. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1548,1562(1980) (footnote omitted). In his dissent,
Justice Rehnquist emphasized the quoted language as the core holding with which he disagreed. Id. at
1581 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The history of purposeful discriminatory voting practices is recounted
in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 & n.47 (1966). Writing for the majority in City of
Romne, Justice Marshall focused on "Congress' considered determination that . . . statutory
remedies were necessary to counter the perpetuation of 95 years of pervasive voting discrimination."
100 S. Ct. at 1565.
27. See, e.g.. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,267
(1977) ("The historical background of the [governmental] decision is one evidentiary source,
particularly if it reveals a series of official actions taken for invidious purposes.") (citations omitted).
Quite simply. "the invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must ultimately be
traced to a racially discriminatory purpose." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
28. A past violation changes the focus of the court from finding a present violation to
determining "whether the [governmental entity] has taken steps adequate to abolish the dual,
segregated system." Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430,437 (1968). Like the defendant in Green,
the City of Rome was "clearly charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be
necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated root and
branch." Id. at 437-38 (citations omitted). Yet, the trial court found as a matter of fact that changes in
the voting practices and annexation ofdisproportionately white-populated areas would thwart a black
candidate's chance to get elected. City of Rome v. United States, 100 St. Ct. at 1565-66 & 1566 nn.19-
21.
29. City of Rome v. United States, 100 . Ct. 1548, 1560 (1980).
30. Id., quoting South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309, 314-15 (1966).
31. See notes 49-102 and accompanying text infra.
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purposeful discrimination to impact discrimination appears to be
markedly different than what the Voting Rights Act Congress found to be
a continued exercise in purposeful discrimination. Impact discrimination
in employment was viewed as a separate but related constitutional
violation. To combat that form of discrimination, Congress joined the
remedial process of Title VII with a previously excluded set of victims,
state and local government employees.32 In contrast, the Voting Rights Act
created a remedial process that included a substantive definition of the
violation to be remedied.33 What City of Rome does is to defer to the
congressional definition, which was based on findings approved in South
Carolina v. Katzenbach. In Title VII Congress did not purport to define
either purposeful discrimination or section 1 of the fourteenth amend-
ment, and City of Rome is thus inapposite.
III. A PRIMER ON TITLE VII DISCRIMINATION
Title VII was enacted "to ensure equality of employment oppor-
tunities by eliminating those practices and devices that discriminate on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin. 34 Employment
discrimination proscribed by Title VII occurs in two forms: differential
treatment and disparate impact. When an "employer simply treats some
people less favorably than others because of their35 protected class
membership, a discriminatory purpose or intent is manifest. When an
employer treats an employee similarly to other employees, but the
treatment results in a disparity based on a proscribed criterion, a
discriminatory impact occurs. 36
Consider, for example, Dothard v. Rawlinson.37 Alabama would not
assign women to prison guard positions that required direct contact with
maximum security prisoners. Since men were so assigned, Alabama had
engaged in differential treatment by purposely discriminating on the basis
of sex. 38 Had Alabama instead declared that both female and male guards
32. See notes 66-75 and accompanying text infra.
33. In dissent, Justice Rehnquist demonstrates that the Voting Rights Act does more than set a
burden of proof. City of Rome v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1548, 1581-82 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting). The majority had approved a trial court finding "that the disapproved electoral changes
and annexations had not been made for any discriminatory purpose." Id. at 1559. Thus, were burden
of proof involved, a disfavored "irrebuttable presumption that'vote diluting changes are motivated by
a discriminatory animus" would be used. Id. at 1581-82 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Instead, the Voting
Rights Act created a substantive violation from that impact discrimination nurtured in a context of
historical purposeful discrimination.
34. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
35. Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (footnote added).
36. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
37. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
38. Id. at 332. Because Alabama was allowed to interject the statutory defense of bona fide
occupational qualification (bfoq), the discriminatory treatment did not violate Title VI 1. Section 703(e)
of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1976), permits discrimination on the basis of religion, sex, or
national origin (but not on the basis of race or color) when any of the criteria is a bfoq "reasonably
necessary to the normal operation of that particular business or enterprise." A bfoq is established bya
factual or legal showing that the requirements of a particular job disqualify all or substantially all
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would be assigned contact positions so long as they satisfied neutrally
applied minimum height and weight requirements that could be met by
disproportionately more men than women, Alabama would have engaged
in disparate impact discrimination.3
While not foreclosing the possibility that Alabama could be accused
of discriminatory treatment via those neutral standards because the
disparate impact was so reasonably foreseeable that the differential must
have been intentional,40 the Supreme Court has often distinguished
members of a covered class. Compare Diaz v. Pan Am,442 F.2d 385,388 (5thCir. 1971) with Weeks v.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969).
Classic examples of a bfoq are wet nurses and sperm bank donors. A bfoq may not be established
"on the basis of stereotyped characterizations of the sexes." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 333
(footnote omitted). Accord, City of Los Angeles v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 (1978) ("Myths and
purely habitual assumptions about a woman's inability to perform certain kinds of work are no longer
acceptable reasons for refusing to employ qualified individuals, or forpaying them less.") Alabama did
not rely on stereotypes; instead, the bfoq was established by the "peculiarly inhospitable" environment
of sub-standard prisons, a chaotic environment in which female guards would be at a disadvantage
precisely because of their sex. Id. at 334. Allowing Alabama to build a defense on unconstitutionally
operated prisons "sounds distressingly like saying two wrongs make a right," id. at 342 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); however, Dothard may also be read to require an extraordinary factual setting to satisfy
"an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of discrimination." Id. at 334 (footnote
omitted.)
39. Alabama used height and weight minima for all law enforcement officials, Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 324, and the Court upheld the district court findings based upon national
statistics that the minima had a discriminatory impact because women, on the average, are shorterand
weigh less than men. Id. at 329-30. See also Vanguard Justice Soe'y. Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670,
710 (D. Md. 1979); Note, Height Standards in Police Employment and the Question of Sex
Discrimination: The Availability of Two Defenses for a Neutral Employment Policy Found
Discrininatory Under Title VII, 47 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 588 (1974).
40. Title VII differentiates, however, between discriminatory treatment and discriminatory
impact. Section 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976), has two subsections:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(i) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
Subsection (I) was construed in Gilbert v. General Electric Corp., 429 U.S. 125, 133, 149 (1976), to have
a meaning similar to the "concept of'discrimination' "in the fourteenth amendment. The distinction
between treatment and impact in decisions construing the fourteenth amendment is, therefore,
instructive, if not controlling, on discriminatory treatment under Title VII. The concurrence byJustice
Stevens in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), would support an "objective intent" standard:
"Frequently the most probative evidence of intent will be objective evidence of what actually happened
rather than evidence describing the subjective state of mind of the actor. For normally the actor is
presumed to have intended the natural consequences of his deeds." Id. at 253. Nonetheless, in
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court upheld a civil service veterans'
preference despite its disparate impact on women:
The decision to grant a preference to veterans was of course "intentional." So, necessarily, did
an adverse impact upon non-veterans follow from that decision. And it cannot seriously be
argued that the legislature of Massachusetts could have been unaware that most veterans are
men. It would thus be disingenuous to say that the adverse consequences of this legislation for
women were unintended, in the sense that they were not volitional or in the sense that they
were not foreseeable.
"Discriminatory purpose," however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as
awareness of consequences. . . . It implies that the decision maker . .. selected or
reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part "because of," not merely "in spite of,"
its adverse effects upon an identifiable group."
Id. at 278-79 (citation omitted).
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intentional discrimination from impact discrimination.41 The distinction is
hardly unassailable, but its mischief would be multiplied were state and
local government employers granted immunity from liability for impact
discrimination.42
41. The Court has allowed "a strong inference that the adverse effects were desired" to be drawn
from discriminatory impact that inevitably occurs as a result of a government act. Personnel
Administrator v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 n.25 (1979). "Necessarily, an invidious discriminatory
purpose may often be inferred from the totality of relevant facts, including the fact, ifit is true, that the
law bears more heavily on one race than another." Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
Accord, Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266-68 (1977)
(starting with discriminatory impact, a proof of discriminatory intent proceeds to the historical
background (including legislative and administrative history), contemporary statements, procedural
regularity, sequence of events, and whatever other circumstances exist); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v.
Pennick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) ('ITjhe District Court correctly noted that actions having
foreseeable and anticipated disparate impact are relevant evidence to prove the ultimate fact, forbidden
purpose."). For an application of circumstantial evidence to prove intentionally discriminatory
employment practices, see Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671,693 (6th Cir. 1979).
See also Note, The Role of Circumstantial Evidence in Proving Discriminatory Intent: Developments
Since Washington v. Davis, 19 B.C.L. REV. 795, 798 (1978).
My colleague Professor Michael J. Perry argues that "a rule that all facially neutral decisions
having a disproportionate racial impact are subject to a heavier burden ofjustification would better
serve the principle of the moral equality of the races." Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1040 (1979) (footnote omitted). He would
subject impact decisions to an intermediate, not strict, standard of equal protection review. Perry, The
Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 559-61, 563-66
(1977). While not couched in intermediate standard language, see, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76
(1971), the Court pursues an activist role in opening motivation to judicial inspection. ProfessorTribe
concludes from the Arlington Heights line of cases that "the Court has yielded a great deal, at least as
regards prior decisions in which it said that inquiry into legislative motive is impermissible. . . .The
Court has now reversed that view, holding that an inquiry into motive is permissible, and giving lots of
ways that can be proved, including impact to a certain extent." J. CHOPER, Y. KAMISER & L. TRIBE, THE
SUPREME COURT: TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS 58-59 (1979). Cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
383 (1968) ("It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an
otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive."). Judicial scrutiny
of motive has become an intellectual battleground, and the warriors have well dissected the subject.
Brest, The Supreme Court, 1975 Term - Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90
HARV. L. REV. 1, 21-53 (1976); Eisenberg, Disproportionate Impact and Illicit Motive: Theories of
Constitutional Adjudication, 52 N.Y.U.L. REV. 36, 94-155 (1977); Ely, LegislativeandAdministrative
Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1207 (1970). The moral claim, then, is served by
a searching inquiry beneath the surface of the governmental act. Even that inquiry, though, appar-
ently lacks enough moral suasion to lay claim to a strict scrutiny standard of review. Yet, either
discriminatory impact is just the flip side of discriminatory intent, which would engage strict scrutiny,
or impact differs in a significant way from intent, which would justify lesser scrutiny. The preferable
moral claim to make is the former because impact, at least when readily foreseeable, is not sufficiently
distinguishable from intent to warrant less scrutiny. This is the strong moral claim Professor Dworkin
makes by suggesting "that individuals have a right to equal concern and respect in the design and
administration of the political instructions that govern them." R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERI-
ousLY 180 (1977). Equality is defined to include impact. So defined, the distinction between intentional
and impact discrimination evaporates, and government must be put to the strict scrutiny test for both.
A strong moral claim is anathema to the Washington v. Davis distinction: "A rule that a statute
designed to serve neutral ends is nevertheless invalid, absent compelling justification, if in practice it
benefits or burdens one race more than another would be far reaching and would raise serious
questions about, and perhaps invalidate, a whole range of tax, welfare, public service, regulatory, and
licensing statutes that may be more burdensome to the poor and to the average black than to the more
affluent white." 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976). A strong moral claim need not be diluted by a lesserstandard
to avoid this parade of"horribles." Conversely, only when strict scrutiny, based on the deeper equality
Professor Dworkin suggests, is used does the promise of judicial activism in the name of equality
deliver real relief to burdened groups.
42. Articles criticizing the Washington v. Davis distinction, 426 U.S. 229,239 (1976), are legion.
See, e.g., Friedman, The Burger Court and the Prima Facie Case in Employment Discrimination: A
Critique, 65 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 17-23 & 17 n.90 (1979); Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of
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Racial Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 540, 548-50 (1977); Schwemm, From Washington to
Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatory Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 961, 994-1000. The Court, however, has not retreated. See notes 40 & 41 supra. Were the
constitutional holding extended to statutory liability, the effect would be to preclude currently typical
challenges to state and local government employment practices. These challenges generally rest on the
disparate impact of "selection devices, including a height requirement and physical abilities test." Blake
v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1370-71 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionforcert.filed,48 U.S.L.W. 3013
(U.S. Jul. 12, 1979) (police department charged with sex discrimination), See Scott v. City of Anniston,
597 F.2d 897, 898 (5th Cir. 1979),petitionfor cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Sept. 7, 1979) (public
works department charged with race discrimination through personnel tests); Brown v. New Haven
Civil Serv. Bd., 474 F. Supp. 1256, 1258 (D. Conn. 1979) (police department charged with race
discrimination through a written exam used as part of hiring process); Vanguard Justice Soc'y, Inc. v.
Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670, 674 (D. Md. 1979) (police department charged with race and sex
discrimination through employment qualifications). Absent an "objective intent" standard, see note 40
supra, none of these practices, which are usually part of civil service reform, could be proven a product
of discriminatory intent.
The impact of those practices still might be reached indirectly. For example, the State and Local
Financial Assistance (Revenue Sharing) Act of 1972, 21 U.S.C. § 1221 (1976), and the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3766 (1976), contain provisions that would survive
any undercutting of congressional powerfrom the fourteenth amendment or the commerce clause. The
Revenue Sharing Act provision states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, national origin, or sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of or be subjected to discrimination
under any program or activity of a State government or unit of local government, which
government or unit receives funds under subchapter I of this chapter.
31 U.S.C. § 1242(a)(1) (1976) (religion, age, and handicap are later covered in the statute) (emphasis
added). This provision is substantially paralleled by the Safe Street Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3766(c)(1) (1976)
(handicap is not included).
Regulations promulgated under the Revenue Sharing Act incorporate Title VII standards, which
are understood to include impact discrimination. Nondiscrimination by Recipient Governments
Receiving Entitlement Funds, 31 C.F.R. § 51.53(b) (1977). See United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F.
Supp. 612, 619 (W.D.N.Y. 1978) (legal standard in the Act "closely parallels" Title VII). A similar
regulation, though premised on Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et. seq.
(1976). defines discrimination in impact terms and applies to the Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration. Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted Programs - Implementation of Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 C.F.R. § 42.104(b) (1973). See United States v. Commonwealth of
Virginia, 454 F. Supp. 1077, 1085 (E.D. Va.), vacated on procedural grounds, 569 F.2d 1300, 1302-03
(4th Cir. 1978). See also United States v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1979) (a
funds cut-offsought because the police department used hiring tests that had a discriminatory impact.)
Congress has the "power to fix the terms on which its money allotments to States shall be
disbursed." Lau v. Nichols, 441 U.S. 563, 569 (1974). In Lau, a school district was contractually bound
to comply with federal civil rights law, and the Court agreed a duty existed to provide remedial English
instruction to children whose first language was Chinese. The reasoning was that "[d]iscrimination is
barred which has that [adverse] effect even though no purposeful design is present." Id. at 568.
A strain of "pursestrings control" logic was also cited in debate over extending Title VII to public
employers:
Mr. President, it is clear that with the expenditure of such sums comes the responsibility of
making sure that the distribution and use of the funds is without discrimination. The failure
to have adequate minority representation in those agencies of Government responsible for
expending those funds is an element of this discrimination.
118 CONG. REC. 1816 (1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams, floor manager). Title VII is a regulatory, not a
spending, measure, and it is doubtful Congress relied on its art, I, § 8 constitutional spending power in
enacting the extension to public employers. The existence of the spending power will not likely suffice
to justify an impact standard when Congress pursues a different constitutional course. In Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), five justices held that Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000d, et seq. (1976), required a showing of intent to discriminate. 438 U:S. at 287
(Powell. J.); 438 U.S. at 325 (Brennan, White, Marshall, & Blackman, J.J.). Accord, Harris v. White,
479 F. Supp. 996, 1002-03 (D. Mass. 1979) (Five justices "explicitly held that Title VI prohibits racial
classifications to precisely the same extent as does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."). The Court has since indicated that the critical point is congressional intent. If Congress
were bent on incorporating the fourteenth amendment standard, then the funding condition would
parallel the equal protection clause. If, however, Congress wanted to impose an impact standard, the
Lau description of plenary power would allow the condition. In Board of Educ. v. Harris, 100 S. Ct.
363, 374 (1979). the Court, in a majority opinion representing six justices, reserved an opinion on the
body count in Bakke and looked for a "positive indication" from Congress that a definition of
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A prima facie case of impact discrimination is simple to show;
sufficient statistical disparity will transfer the burden of proof.43 In
contrast, a prima facie case of intentional discrimination usually requires
drawing an inference of dissimilar treatment.44 The defense to impact
discrimination is "business necessity," which means that an employment
discrimination parallel to the fourteenth amendment was intended in the Emergency School Aid Act
(ESAA). 20 U.S.C. § 3191 et seq. (Supp. 11 1978). Because "[i]t does make sense to us that Congress
might impose a stricter standard under ESAA than under Title VI," an impact standard was
acceptable. 100 S. Ct. at 374. Thus, the Court's "primary concern is with the intent of Congress." Id. at
368. ESAA provides funds to schools undergoing financial pressures because they are desegregating.
Under the statute, a school is ineligible if it engages in discrimination or "had in effect any practice,
policy, or procedure which results in the disproportionate demotion or dismissal" of minority
personnel. 20 U.S.C. § 3196(c) (1)(B) (Supp. 111978). That impact language was contrasted with Title
VI and characterized as "an attempt by Congress to bring about the same remedy without regard to the
cause of the problem, while Title VI may have been intended to remedy the problem only when its cause
was intentional discrimination." 100 S. Ct. at 374 n.13. The three dissenters disagreed on legislative
intent, not power. Id. at 381 (Stewart, J., writing for Powell & Rehnquist, JJ., dissenting).
Congressional intent is also not affected by the tenth amendment as applied in National League of
Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). There, the Court noted that congressional spending power was not
at issue and would "express no view" on that power. Id. at 852 n.17. In Morrow v. Califano, 445 F.
Supp. 532, 533 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (three-judge court), summarily affd, 435 U.S. 962 (1978), however,
grants from federal health programs were conditioned on establishment of a state "certificate of need
program" to guarantee federal monies went only where the need existed. Professor Tribe infers from
the summary decision that "[t]he Court seems to have accepted the principle that when Congress pays
the piper as well as calls the tune, there is no real threat to the autonomy either of the states or of
individuals." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 18 (Supp. 1979) (footnote omitted). National
League is, therefore, no impediment to an impact standard being imposed by a spending measure,
Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. at 536 n. 10, even though it may apply, depending on how its factors
are balanced, to a regulatory measure like Title VII. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at
856 (Blackmun, J., concurring with four justices to form a majority).
43. "[T]o establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the
facially neutral standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory
pattern." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977). In Dothard, nearly half the female
population of the state was disqualified for hire by the height and weight criteria, while only one percent
of the male population was affected. Id. at 329-30. In the seminal case on disparate impact, Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430 n.6 (197 1), the ratio of white to black males qualified forhire under
a high school completion criterion was three to one; under a battery of pen and paper tests, the ratio of
passing whites to blacks was nearly ten to one. The enforcement agencies have adopted Uniform
Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (1978) (Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n); 41 C.F.R. § 60-3 (1978) (Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs); 28
C.F.R. § 50.14 (1978) (Dep't of Justice); 5 C.F.R. § 300.103(c) (1979) (Civil Serv. Comm'n). The
guidelines establish a "rule of thumb" known as the "45th test": if the protected group scores at a rate
80% or lower than the highest scoring group, then significant adverse impact is suspected. 29 C.F.R. §
1607.4D; 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4(D); 28 C.F.R. § 50.14.4D; 5 C.F.R. § 300.104(c). But cf. Rich v. Martin
Marietta Corp., 467 F. Supp. 587, 611 (D. Colo. 1979) (the 45th test is not a statistically sophisticated
standard and may be rebutted).
The textual reference to burden of proof is purposely imprecise. As a matter of evidence, the
plaintiff retains the "burden of persuasion" throughout, the "defendant's burden is merely a burden of
production." Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 604 F.2d 106,108 (Ist Cir. 1979), on remandfrom 439 U.S.
24 (1978); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003, 1011-12 (1st Cir. 1979). Thus, the defendant may be forced
by a sufficient statistical disparity to bear the burden of going forward. Wright v. National Archives
and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702,714 n.13 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Yet, as indicated in note 45 infra,
the defense to adverse impact is so tough to make that the practical effect is to transfer the burden of
proof.
44. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the Court established the
framework for inferential proof. To establish a prima facie case, a plaintiff had to prove:
(i) that [an individual] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a
job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was
rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer
continued to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. With slight modification, this framework can apply to all employment practices. Id. at 832
n. 13. Inference is the common route to proving discrimination because "[p]ersons engaged in unlawful
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practice "must [also] be essential to that goal., 45 Such a defense is not
simple to show. Again, this contrasts with the defense to inferred
intentional discrimination, which involves first the articulation, and later,
conduct seldom write letters or make public pronouncements explicitly stating their attitudes or
objectives; such facts must usually be discovered by inference; the evidence does not come in packages
labeled, 'use me,' like the cake bearing the words 'eat me,' which Alice found helpful in Wonderland."
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. NLRB, 121 F.2d 658, 660 (2d Cir. 1941). The McDonnell framework is "a
practical scheme of proof for addressing the critical issue of intentional racial or other impermissible
discrimination." Wright v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609 F.2d 702, 713 (4th Cir. 1979) (en
banc).
The inference goes to the existence of an intent to treat a group or individual discriminatorily.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 325 n.15 (1977); Burdine v. Texas Dep't of Community
Affairs, 608 F.2d 563,566 (5th Cir. 1979). One circumstance supporting the inference can be the adverse
impact on the group or individual affected. Cf note 27 supra. "Whe re gross statistical disparities can be
shown, they alone may in a proper case constitute prima facie proof of a pattern or practice of
discrimination." Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,307-08 (1977) (citation omitted),
Statistics are, therefore, "not wholly irrelevant on the issue of intent." Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 580 (1978). The McDonnellframework also was a statistical backdrop for an individual's
case. The individual would argue that the employer's conduct "conformed to a general pattern of
discrimination against" the group in which he was a member. 411 U.S. at 805.
The rationale underlying proof of intent by statistical inference is:
Statistics showing racial or ethnic imbalance are probative . . . only because such
imbalance is often a telltale sign of purposeful discrimination; absent explanation, it is
ordinarily to be expected that non-discriminatory hiring practices will in time result in a work
force more or less representative of the racial and ethnic composition of the population in the
community from which employees are hired.
Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 339 n.20 (1977). Often, however, the explanation will be readily
available, see note 46 infra. Moreover, statistical analysis is an experts' paradise. See, e.g., Shoben,
Differential Pass-Fail Rates in Employment Testing: Statistical Proof Under Title VII, 91 HARv. L.
REv. 793, 795-96 (1978). Thus, the Court has stated: "We caution only that statistics are not irrefutable,
they come in infinite variety and, like any other kind of evidence, they may be rebutted. In short, their
usefulness depends on all of the surrounding facts and circumstances." Teamsters v. United States, 431
U.S. at 340 (citation omitted).
45. United States v. St. Louis-San Francisco R.R., 464 F.2d 301, 308 (8th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973). In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971), business necessity
was established as a defense under which the employer had "the burden of showing that any given
requirement [has] ... a manifest relationship to the employment in question." Once that job-
relatedness is proven, "the plaintiff may then show that other selection devices without a similar
discriminatory effect would also 'serve the employer's legitimate interest in efficient and trustworthy
workmanship.' Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, [422 U.S. 405 (1975)] quoting McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 [1973]." Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
The business necessity defense has traditionally been couched in such harsh terms that employers
were dissuaded from relying on it:
The applicable test is not merely whether there exists a business purpose for adhering to a
challenged practice. The test is whether there exists an overriding legitimate business purpose
such that the practice is necessary to thesafe and efficient operation of the business. Thus, the
business purpose must be sufficiently compelling to override any racial impact; the challenged
practice must effectively carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve; and there must be
available no acceptable alternative policies or practices which would better accomplish the
business purpose advanced, or accomplish it equally well with a lesser differential racial
impact.
Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791,798 (4th Cir. 1971) (footnote omitted). That stringency may
now be receding. In N.Y.C. Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), the Court held that a ban on
all drug users "significantly served" the employer's "legitimate employment goals of safety and
efficiency" and was therefore job-related. Id. at 587 n.31. The Court assumed, despite statistical
deficiencies, see Update: Drug Bans, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ADVISOR 39 (1979), that a racially
discriminatory impact resulted from the effect of the ban on methadone users. 440 U.S. at 587. The
Court, however, did not proceed from the finding onjob-relatedness to one on less drastic alternatives.
In a section of the opinion analyzing the constitutional claims, the Court approved the right of an
employer to assist "one class of problem employees," in Beazer, alcoholics, while not aiding drug
abusers. id. at 591 n.37. and rejected a screening device that would have had a lesser adverse impact but
would require special efforts, albeit more inconvenient than costly. Id. at 590 n.33 (burden of proof on
plaintiff to show that abusers "6-ould be excluded as cheaply and effectively in theabsence of the rule").
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if necessary, the proof of "some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for
the employment practice.46 Intentional discrimination, then, is harder to
prove and easier to defend than impact discrimination.47
46. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). In Board of Trustees v.
Sweeney, 439 U.S. 24 (1978) (per curiam), the Court continued to refine the McDonnell burden.
Sweeney held that mere articulation suffices to meet the employee's prima facie case. Id. at 25. At that
point, McDonnell provides the plaintiff"a fair opportunity to show that [the employer's] stated reason
for [the plaintiff's] rejection was in fact pretext." 411 U.S. at 804. The appellate court was accused of
requiring the employer to prove the absence of a discriminatory motive, "a heavier burden," on the
employer than was justified. 439 U.S. at 26 n.2. The appellate decision was vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in light of Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The employer in
Furnco was not required to prove it had used "a hiring procedure that maximizes hiring of minority
employees"; instead, "the burden which shifts to the employer is merely that of proving that he based
his employment decision on a legitimate consideration, and not an illegitimate one such as race." Id. at
577-78.
The Sweeney appellate court had read Furnco to impose a burden to rebut with the burden of
persuasion constantly resting on the plaintiff. 569 F.2d 169, 177 (1st Cir. 1978). Four dissenting
Supreme Court justices in Sweeney questioned how the per curiam opinion differed. They identified
two grounds: (1) articulate must mean something other than prove, and (2) what the employer must
articulate is simply a legitimate reason and not "the real reason for the employment decision." But, they
argued, in a trial context articulation amounts to proving a fact, and any showing of a
nondiscriminatory reason "simultaneously demonstrat[es] that the action was not motivated by an
illegitimate factor such as race." 439 U.S. at 28-29 (Stevens, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, Stewart
& Marshall, JJ.). The majority "agreed" with the dissent's definition of the employer's burden if it were
"satisfied if he simply 'explains what he has done' or 'produc[es] evidence of legitimate
nondiscriminatory reasons.' " Id. at 25 n.2, quoting dissent, id. at 28-29. On the second ground, the
majority must have perceived a sharper distinction.
One explanation of that distinction is the Court's willingness to immunize otherwise
discriminatory treatment when a separate cause for the treatment is nondiscriminatory. In Mt. Healthy
City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977), the court approved a defense that
proved "by a preponderance of the evidence that [the employer] would have reached the same decision
as to [the applicant's or employee's status] even in absence of the [illegal reason]." There, suppression of
protected speech was one reason for a discharge, but another, independent reason was misbehavior.
Because the speech was not a proximate cause, there being an intervening and independent cause, the
discharge could be upheld. For Title VII employment discrimination cases, this principle parallels the
rationale for the McDonnell inference:
The method suggested in McDonnell Douglas for pursuing this [disparate treatment]
inquiry, however, was never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or ritualistic. Rather, it is
merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the evidence in light of common experience as it
bears on the critical question of discrimination. A prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if
otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the consideration of impermissible
factors ... And we are willing to presume this largely because we know from our
experience that more often than not people do not act in a totally arbitrary manner, without
any underlying reasons, especially in a business setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for
rejecting an applicant have been eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is
more likely than not the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason,
lased his decision on an impermissible consideration such as race.
Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). If the employer has two reasons, one
discriminatory and one nondiscriminatory, a court could not infer the discriminatory one existed once
the employer asserted the nondiscriminatory one and withstood a challenge that it was pretextual. See
Illustrating a Keen(e) Distinction," I EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION ADVISOR 21, 22 (1979).
Under this standard, any inference of a discriminatory reason would merely shift to the employer
"the burden of establishing that the same decision would have resulted even had the impermissible
purpose not been considered." Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 270 n.21 (1977). Yet, the Supreme Court has indicated that discrimination need only be"one
of the motivating factors, not that it has been a necessary factor." Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996,
1006 (D. Mass. 1979). In Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979), the Court refused to draw
nice causative lines: "Discriminatory intent is simply not amenable to calibration. It either is a factor
that has influenced the legislative choice or it is not." Id. at 278. The extended quote from Feeney in
note 40 supra includes a lower causation correlation: the decision need only be made "at least in part
'because of' "a discriminatory reason. 442 U.S. at 279. In Village of Arlington Heights, the Court paid
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IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 1972 AMENDMENTS
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 added to the
definition of "person" in Title VII the words: "governments, governmental
agencies, political subdivisions. 48 The term "industry affecting com-
merce" was amended by the phrase "and . . . further includes any
governmental industry, business, or activity. 4 9 These amendments
represented "a hotly contested issue."50 Their legislative history is revealing
about both (1) the assertion that Congress meant to expand on the equal
protection clause definition of person subsequently given in Washington v.
Davis51 and (2) the Fitzpatrick conclusion that "[t]here is no dispute that in
homage to Mt. Healthy in the footnote quoted above while delivering a strong argument for a less
demanding burden:
[ Washington v.] Davis [426 U.S. 229 (1976)] does not require a plaintiff to prove that the
challenged action rested solely on racially discriminatory purposes. Rarely can it be said that
a legislature or administrative body operating under a broad mandate made a decision
motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a particular purpose was the"dominant" or
"primary" one. In fact, it is because legislators and administrators are properly concerned
with balancing numerous competing considerations that courts refrain from reviewing the
merits of their decisions, absent a showing of arbitrariness or irrationality. But racial
discrimination is not just another competing consideration. When there is a proof that a
discriminatory purpose has been a motivating factor in the decision, thisjudicial deference is
no longer justified.
429 U.S. at 265-66 (footnote omitted).
The riddle becomes "when is a motivating factor not a caustive one?" Mt. Healthy answers this by
holding that a prima facie case is shown when discrimination is a motivating factor, but rebuttal of that
case occurs by a showing that the action complained of would have occurred in any event. 429 U.S. at
287; Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1006 n.3. (D. Mass. 1979). After Mt. Healthy and Sweeney, the
burden of defending against an inferential case of discriminatory treatment is very light. Even when
discrimination "does indeed play a part in that decision," liability arises only under a "but-for"
causation showing. Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 285 (1977).
Accord, Fisher v. Flynn, 598 F.2d 663,665 (1 st Cir. 1979). But cf. Smith v. Sol D. Adler Realty Co., 436
F.2d 344, 349-50 (7th Cir. 1971) (Non-racial and racial reasons were relied upon to deny a lease;
however, "race is an impermissible factor in an apartment rental decision and . . . cannotbebrushed
aside because it was neither the sole reason nor the total factor. We find no acceptable place in the law
for partial racial discrimination.").
47. "A claimant's path after establishment of a prima facie case is considerably easier under the
impact theory than under the treatment theory ... " Wright v. National Archives and Rec. Serv.,
609 F.2d 702, 711 n.7 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc). Impact analysis also provides"a relatively easy burden
of prima facie proof." Id. at 712-13. See Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to
Establish a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGo L. REv.
207, 217 & nn. 60-65 (1979) and cases cited therein ("The significance of this 'effects test in Title VII
litigation cannot be understated [sic]."). State and local government employment practices would
seldom be found discriminatory were purpose, motivation, or intent a necessary proof ingredient, see
note 42 supra.
48. Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972), amending, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(a). When enacted in
1964. the definition of "person" in Title VII did not mention state and local governments. The definition
of employment agency, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(c), excluded an agency of a state or political subdivision.
Pub. L. No. 880352, 78 Stat. 253 (1964). That exclusion was removed by the 1972 amendments.
49. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (1972),
amending, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(h). The remaining text was left intact.
50. 118 CONG. REC. 4940 (1972) (remarks of Senator Williams, floor manager). Rollcall votes,
lengthy debate, and invocation of cloture highlighted the legislative history. Id. at 4908. The original
adoption of Title VII was the product of an even greater legislative battle. See Vaas, Title VIIA
Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & CoN. L. REV. 431 (1966).
51. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
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enacting the 1972 Amendments to Title VII to extend coverage to the
States as employers, Congress exercised its power under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. ' 2
A. Defining Equal Protection
In 1972, Congress was oblivious to the definition of the fourteenth
amendment handed down by the Supreme Court in 1976. That is not to say
Congress was without a fixed notion of what the substantive reach of Title
VII as amended would be. The catalyst for extension of Title VII to public
employers was recognition that "[a] major reason why EEOC [Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission] has not been able to be more
effective in eliminating employment discrimination is that large numbers
of workers have not been covered. 53
Senator Williams, the floor manager for the bill, explained that "the
more than 10 million State and local government employees, constitute the
largest class of persons exempt from the operation of Federal non-
discrimination laws. 54 The Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee
report on the bill noted that "all indications are that the number of State
and local employees will continue to increase more rapidly during the next
few years."
These employees were victims of discrimination. Congress accepted
the findings of a report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights
that concluded that "[s]tate and local governments have failed to fulfill
their obligation to assure equal job opportunity., 56 The report "indicates
52. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 443 n.9 (1976). The Court distinguished Title VII from
legislation "based on the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause." 427 U.S. at 452. Because
Title VII provided a "context of legislation passed pursuant to Congress' authority under § 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment," 427 U.S. at 453 (footnote omitted), the states rights challenge could be
deflected. The Fitzpatrick conclusion about the constitutional anchor for Title VII was not mere dicta
but rather was central to its analysis.
53. 117 CONG. REc. 32097 (1971) (Remarks of Rep. Abzug).
54. 118 CONG. REc. 1816 (1972). Indeed, "State and local governments are the largest single
group of employers in the United States." Hearings on H.R. 1746 Before the House Gen. Subcomm. on
Labor, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 85 (1971) (statement of William H. Brown, III, Chair, Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n). "There are over 9.5 million persons engaged in 81,000 State and local
governments." Id. at 302 (statement of Rep. Chisolm).
55. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (197 1), excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 1070
(1972). See also 117 CONG. REC. 31961 (197 1) (There had been"an increase of over 2 million in less than
a decade."). (Rep. Perkins, floor manager).
56. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 1070
(1972). The report was U.S.COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FOR ALL THE PEOPLE . . . BY ALL THE
PEOPLE: A REPORT ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT(1969),
excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 1816 (1972). Congress has relied on a United States Commission
on Civil Rights report in enacting legislation securing minorities voting rights, and in South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 330 (1966), the Court held that "Congress . . . may avail itself of
information from any probative source." A second report, U.S. COM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, MEXICAN
AMERICANS AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN THE SOUTHWEST (1970), was also cited to support
a finding of state and local government employment discrimination. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1971), excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 1070(1972); H. R. REP. No.92-238, 92d Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2152. Hearings on H. R. 1746 Before the House
General Subcommittee on Labor, 92d Cong., lstSess. 113 (1971) (statement of Howard A. Glockstein,
Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights).
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that employment discrimination in State and local governments is more
pervasive than in the private sector."57 The Commission's findings
described the discrimination as "perpetuated by both institutional and
overt discriminatory practices, and that past discriminatory practices are
maintained through de facto segregated job ladders, invalid selection
techniques, and stereotypical misconceptions by supervisors regarding
minority group capabilities." 58 The report informed Congress that "[u]n-
constitutional practices include not only those which are purposeful-
ly discriminatory, but also those which have the effect of creating or
reinforcing barriers to equal employment opportunity."'5 9
The legislative history repeatedly shows a desire to provide state and
local government employees "the same benefits and protections in equal
employment as the employees in the private sector of the economy."60
Representative Mink testified that "[t]here is no reason why persons
working in the public sector should not enjoy the same protection and
rights as those in the private.' , 6' The House Education and Labor
Committee report stated that "it is an injustice to provide employees in the
private sector with an administrative forum in which to redress their
grievances while at the same time, denying a similar protection to the
57. 118 CONG. REC. 1815 (1972) (remarks Sen. Williams). "[T]he Commission examined equal
opportunity in public employment throughout the country-North as well as South-and reported
widespread discrimination against minority groups in State, city, and suburban government
employment." Hearings on H. R. 1746 Before the House General Subcommittee on Labor, 92d Cong.,
1st Sess. 112 (197 1) (statement of Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights,
reading from the 1969 report). The chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
concluded: "[O]bviously many of these States have a lot of discrimination being practiced by the States
themselves." Id. at 96 (statement of William H. Brown, III). Because the number of employees and
breadth of discrimination had been so great, "coverage of governmental employees [was] a
monumentally important step for the cause of equal employment opportunity." 118 CONG. REC. 4940
(1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams, floor manager).
58. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), excerpts reprintedin 118 CONG. REc. 1070
(1972). Accord, 117 CONG. REc. 31961 (1971) (remarks of Rep. Perkins, floor manager).
59. 118 CONG. REC. 1817 (1972) (U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights 1969 report, supra note 56). See
also S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 10 (1971).
60. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 1070
(1972). The Chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claimed Title VII
"paradoxically withholds a Federal protection which is made available to employees in the private
sector to whom the government owes no comparable constitutional duties." Hearings on H.R 1746
Before the House General Subcommittee on Labor, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 85-86 (1971) (statement of
William H. Brown, 1i).
In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Court recognized this history. "Congress expressly indicated the
intent that the same Title VII principles be applied to governmental and private employers alike." 433
U.S. 321, 332 n.4 (1977) (citations omitted). One court has held that "the whole purpose of the 1972
Amendments was to give public employees the same protection against discrimination as those enjoyed
by employees in the private sector." Vanguard Just. Soc'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F. Supp. 670,700 (D.
Md. 1979) (citation omitted). This purpose was paralleled as to federal government employees through
enactment of§ 717,42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840,848-49 (1976).
Congressional power to establish standards for federal employees that include impact discrimination
seems unimpeachable. Cf. Brown v. GSA, 425 U.S. 820, 828-29, 833-35 (1976) (Title VII "provides the
exclusive judicial remedy for claims of discrimination in federal employment").
61. 117 CONG. REC. 32105 (1971).
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increasing number of state and local employees. 62 Approval of the
Griggs61 impact standard appears throughout the legislative history.
64
At a minimum, Congress' understanding of what discrimination was
proscribed by the equal protection clause rested on the impact standard.65
But the legislative history does not support the proposition that Congress
intended to redefine, rather than use the current definition of, the equal
protection clause. The legislative purpose to reach all discrimination by
public employers, whether intentional or impact discrimination, is
apparent. The method chosen was, however, establishment of a remedy,
not creation of substantive rights. This dichotomy is exemplified by
Senator Cranston's remarks during floor debate:
Both the Constitution and Federal law prohibit job discrimination by
state and local governments, but the existence of pervasive discrimination in
State and local government is all too well documented. What is lacking,
however, is an effective Federal administrative machinery to enforce these
prohibitions. Thus, the expansion of Title VII coverage to state and local
governments is necessary if we are to provide a truly effective means of
implementing the declared equal opportunity employment policy of our
66
nation.
The House Committee report emphasized "the protection of an effective
forum" to provide "equal access to the remedies available under the Act."
67
The substantive constitutional protection had "been seriously impeded by
the failure of the Congress to provide Federal administrative machinery to
assist the aggrieved employee.,
68
Instead, employees were left to a "time consuming and expensive
lawsuit."6 9 The House Committee report deemed it "unrealistic to expect
disadvantaged individuals to bear the burden" of a federal lawsuit to
enforce their rights.70 Even a litigant with resources would only enforce
equal employment opportunity in a "random" way with "the main concern
[being] redress of his particular grievance.,
71
62. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODECONG. & AD. NEWs
2153-54.
63. See text accompanying note 36 supra.
64. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong. 2d Sess. reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. NEws
2138,2155-60. See Comment, Burden of Proof in Racial Discrimination Acts Brought Under the Civil
Rights Acts of 1866 and 1870: Disproportionate Impact or Discriminatory Purpose, 1978 B.Y.L. REV.
1030, 1049 n. 101 and citations to legislative history therein; Pennsylvania Club Valiants v. Rizzo, 466
F. Supp. 1219, 1226 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
65. Id. The legislative finding of discrimination was premised on a report that highlighted
impact-type practices. See notes 49 & 50 and accompanying text supra.
66. 118 CONG. REC. 4931 (1972).
67. H. R. REp. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2152.
68. Id. at 2153.
69. Hearings on H.R. 1736 Before the House General Subcommittee on Labor, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 113 (1971) (statement of Howard A. Glickstein, Staff Director, U.S. Comm'n on Civil Rights).
70. H.R. REP. No. 92-238,92d Cong. 2d Sess., reprintedin [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &AD. Navs
2153. The Court has recognized that Title VII creates "a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted
by trained lawyers, initiate the process." Love v. Pullman, 404 U.S. 522, 527 (1972).
71. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS. Supra note 56, 118 CONG. REC. 1819 (1972).
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Congress assumed it was "clear that the guarantee of equal
protection" in the fourteenth amendment applied to state and local
72governments. The House Committee report stated that "[t]he expansion
of Title VII coverage to state and local government employment is firmly
embodied in the principles of the Constitution of the United States.",73 The
report found in the thirteenth and fourteenth amendments the "clear
intention of the Constitution . .. to prohibit all forms of discrimina-
tion. 74 Therefore, as the head of the Civil Rights Division of the United
States Department of Justice testified: "In view of the applicability of the
Equal Protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to such [state and
local] governments, the question here is not one of prescribing new duties,
but rather of determining what federal remedies would be appropriate.,
75
Had Congress been faced with a judicial definition of the equal
protection clause that excluded impact discrimination, the legislative
history reveals that further consideration of (1) the findings on which
extension of Title VII to public employers was based, (2) the acceptance of
the Griggs decision, (3) the desire to provide protection similar to that in
the private sector, and (4) the understanding that impact discrimination is
as invidious as intentional discrimination would have led Congress to the
same conclusion. Congress sought to impose discriminatory impact
statutory liability on state and local government employers. Whether that
conclusion would have been anchored in a congressional version of the
equal protection clause is the more important question in light of
Washington v. Davis.
7 6
B. Enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment
and the Commerce Clause
The footnote in Fitzpatrick77 is correct; the legislative history leaves
no doubt that Congress acted pursuant to section 5 of the fourteenth
amendment. The footnote is not, however, exhaustive; the legislative
history likewise leaves no doubt that Congress acted pursuant to its
plenary power under the commerce clause.
1. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
In floor debate, Senator Williams introduced the expansion of Title
72. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 1070
(1972).
73. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG.& AD.
NEws 2154.
74. Id.
75. Hearings on H. R. 1746 Before the House General Subcommittee on Labor, 92d Cong., Ist
Sess. 35 (1971) (statement of David L. Norman). The House Committee Report emphasized that
existing rights, specifically those under the Civil Rights Act of 1866,42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), werenot
affected; rather, "the remedies available to the individual under Title VII" were to be "co-extensive." H.
R. REP. No. 92-238. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 19, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2154. See
Johnson v. REA. 421 U.S. 454,459 (1975) (citing the House Committee Report to conclude Title VII
does not pre-empt other remedies for discrimination).
76. 426 U.S. 229 (1976). See notes 42-43 and accompanying text supra.
77. 427 U.S. 445, 453 n.96 (1976). See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
1980]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
VII by invoking section 5: "Through use of the enabling clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the promise of equal protection can become a
reality. The last sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment enables Congress
to enforce the amendment's guarantees by appropriate legislation. ' 8 The
Senate Committee report explained:
The last sentence of the Fourteenth Amendment, enabling Congress to
enforce the Amendment's guarantees by appropriate legislation is frequently
overlooked, and the plain meaning of the Constitution allowed to lapse. The
inclusion of State and local government employees within the jurisdiction of
Title VII guarantees and protections will fulfill the Congressional duty to
enact the "appropriate legislation" to insure that all citizens are treated
equally in this country.79
Senator Javits even distinguished the fourteenth amendment from the
commerce clause: "[I]t is very important . .. that we recognize that of all
the provisions in this bill, this has the most solemn congressional sanction,
because it is based not on the commerce clause, which relates to the
relationships between individuals as well as with governments, but is based
on the Fourteenth Amendment. 80
The legislative history shows that congressional objectives paralleled
both branches of the Morgan description of the enforcement power: (1) a
guarantee of equal participation in and services from state and local
governments qua governments, and (2) a guarantee of equal employment
opportunity in state and local governments qua employers.81
78. 118 CONG. REc. 1816 (1972). "IThe legislative history of the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972 demonstrates clearly that the inclusion of state and local government
employees was effected pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Shawer v. Indiana
University, 602 F.2d 1161, 1163 (3rd Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (citation omitted).
79. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92 Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), excerpts reprinted in 118 CoNG. REc. 1070
(1972). The chair of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission testified on this point:
"Legislation to implement this aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment right is long overdue, and I
believe an appropriate remedy is contained in the bill making State and local governments subject to
the requirements of the process of Title VII in the same manner as any other employer." Hearings on
H.R. 1746 Before the House General Subcommittee on Labor, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 86 (1971)
(Statement of William H. Brown, III). For the distinction between imposition of a new procedure to
enforce existing rights and imposition of new rights, see notes 66-75 and accompanying text supra.
80. 118 CONG. REC. 1839 (1972). After that eloquent testimonial to the fourteenth amendment,
Senator Javits hedged his bet on the constitutional anchor two sentences later by adding: "Also, in
Maryland against Wirtz, in 1968, the Court upheld the application of the Fair Labor Standards Act to
certain classes of public employees as a legitimate exercise of congressional regulatory authority under
the commerce clause." Id. Not content with having it both ways, a few sentences further SenatorJavits
raised his first bet: "IThe only way [public employees] can get [equality], because the authority so far as
they are concerned is the State, is at the hands of the United States, under the Fourteenth amendment."
Id. at 1840. In miniature, Senator Javits' recognition of two constitutional anchors, and preference for
the more noble one, mirrors the congressional debate. Cf. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241, 279 (1964) (Douglas J., concurring) ("[T]he right of people to be free of State
action that discriminates against them because of race . . . 'occupies a more protected position in our
constitutional system than does the movement of cattle, fruit, steel and coal across state lines.' ");
Hearings on S. 1732 Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963), excerpts
reprinted in G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 216 (9th ed. 1975); Cox, Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 118 (1966) (fourteenth
amendment anchor means "avoiding the necessity of resorting to the use of the commerce power which
some observers found disingenuous even in the public accommodations title of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.")
81. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 653-54 (1966).
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The House Committee report identified "the most deleterious effect
[of employment discrimination] in those governmental activities which are
most visible to the minority communities (notably education, law
enforcement, and the administration of justice) with the result that the
credibility of the government's claim to represent all the people equally is
negated. 82 The Senate Committee report agreed:
From local law enforcement to social services, each citizen in a community is
in constant contact with many local agencies. The importance of equal
opportunity in these agencies is, therefore, self-evident. In our democratic
society, participatory government is a cornerstone of good government.
Discrimination by government therefore serves a doubly destructive purpose.
The exclusion of minorities from effective participation in the bureaucracy
not only promotes ignorance of minority problems in that particular
community but also creates mistrust, alienation, and all too often hostility
toward the entire process of government.83
Senator Williams based the Committee's conclusion on "the very practical
consideration that employment discrimination at the State and local
government level reflects very unfavorably upon the ability of those
governmental units to deal equitably in their contacts with those groups
against whom they discriminate in employment. ' 4
The legislative history on the pervasiveness of employment dis-
crimination in the public sector, as discussed above, 8g reflects con-
gressional concern with employment discrimination apart from any
collateral effect on delivery of government services.
2. Commerce Clause
Congressional focus on enforcing the fourteenth amendment was
accompanied by recognition of the commerce clause as a constitutional
anchor. Title VII originally was adopted pursuant to the commerce
clause.8 6 In amending Title VII, Congress continued to assert its power to
regulate commerce.
82. H. R. REP. No. 92-238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 2153.
83. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971), excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 1070
(1972).
84. 118 CONG. REC. 1816 (1972). Senator Williams believed that a"participatory government"
demanded equal access to government jobs. Id. at 1815. His fear was that"[tlhe exclusion of minorities
from the effective participation in the bureaucracy . . . promotes ignorance of minority problems in
that particular community .. " Id. Cf. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) ("This
enhanced political power will be helpful in gaining nondiscriminatory treatment in public services for
the entire Puerto Rican community.") (footnote omitted).
85. See notes 56-59 and accompanying text supra.
86. Detroit Police Officers' Ass'n v. Young, 608 F.2d 671,689 n.7 (6th Cir. 1979); Cooksey, The
Role of Law in Equal Employment Opportunity, 7 B.C. IND.& CONt. L. REv. 417, 422 (1966) ("There is
little question that the framers of Title VII did an excellent job in providing a solid constitutional
foundation for the legislation. The power of Congress to regulate commerce has been utilized in an
appropriate manner, and there can be no doubt about the constitutionality of the statute after the
Supreme Court's decision in the McClung and Heart of Atlanta cases.") (footnotes omitted);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), upheld the public accommodations section, Title II, of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000a et seq. (1976), as applied to a restaurant, while Heart of
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Senator Williams characterized the "potential for labor strife" that
arose from treating public sector employees differently than private sector
ones as a "practical consideration."87 "This potential, with its concomitant
effect upon interstate commerce, gives ample reason for imposition of
Federal equal employment standards on state and local governmental
units."88 The Senate Committee report relied on Maryland v. Wirtz,8 9 a
commerce clause decision overruled by National League,90 stating: "The
Supreme Court has further indicated that at least part of the extension of
jurisdiction [over state and local governments] as contemplated by § 2515
is a proper constitutional exercise of power under the Commerce
Clause."91 Maryland v. Wirtz was even reprinted in the Congressional
Record.92
In the legislative debate, the commerce clause served as a response to
opposition based on federalism. Senator Taft referred to Senator
Williams' citation of Maryland v. Wirtz to refute a federalism challenge:
[I]n the committee, with regard to the employing of personnel by state and
local governments, there were a good many comments and a great deal of
discussion as to whether or not constitutional problems that might occur
from the Federal Government's attempting to regulate state and local
governments might be serious. As the Senator from New Jersey has stated,
there are already court holdings on this subject.93
The Senate Committee report cited the case to prove "that Federal
regulation of the employment practices of state and local governments is
[not] an improper infringement upon the sovereignty of the states."94
Senator Williams argued that "[t]he full impact of this case is to suggest
that there are proper situations and proper means to impose Federal
standards upon state and local governments."95 He added:
I would suggest that the insurance of equal employment opportunity is just
such a situation. The means employed by this bill authorize minimal contacts
between the Federal Government and State and local governments; public
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), did the same as to motels. In McClung, the
Court deferred to a congressional finding of a burden on commerce: "[W]here we find that the
legislators, in light of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our investigation is at an end." 379 U.S. at 304-05.
Although the legislative history indicated that Congress relied on the fourteenth amendment as well,
the Court focused on the commerce power, which was "ample" alone. Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at
250.
87. 118 CONG. REC. 1816 (1972).
88. Id.
89. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
90. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
91. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REC. 1070
(1972).
92. 118 CONG. REC. 1833 (1972).
93. Id. at 1837.
94. S. REP. No. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), excerpts reprinted in 118 CONG. REc. 1070
(1972).
95. 118 CONG. REC. 1816 (1972).
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employers will be able to hire whomever they please, so long as it is done in a
nondiscriminatory manner.9'
A colloquy during the House floor debate reflects the same response.
Representative Mazzoli decried "an interposition under the committee bill
which I think is disastrous, that is, the interposition of the Federal
Government into State and local matters. 97 He yielded to Representative
Dent for a question: "Then, would you also say that we should remove
from the jurisdiction of the EEOC all those companies that do not do
interstate business, because intrastate business has just as much right to be
exclusively under State and local government as any other?" 98 The
question was a ringer; congressional power under the commerce clause to
regulate intrastate business had long been established. 99
The legislative history of the 1972 amendments transcends the
implication of the Fitzpatrick footnote 00 that congressional power was
exercised solely under the fourteenth amendment. In Fitzpatrick, two
concurring justices noted that the commerce clause was a constitutional
source of congressional power;10' the Solicitor General has since cited to
the Supreme Court both the commerce clause and section 5 of the
fourteenth amendment as anchors for the 1972 amendment of Title VII.10 2
V. ANALYZING CONSTITUTIONAL ANCHORS
A. The Challenge
The essence of the challenge to a discriminatory impact standard
under Title VII for state and local government employers is that "it is
96. Id.
97. 117 CONG. REc. 31971 (1971). In similar words, Senator Allen stated: "I object, too, to the
extension of the jurisdiction of the EEOC over the employment practices of State, county, and local
governments because I believe Federal bureaucracy should not encroach further on the powers of State
and local governments." 118 CONG. REc. 4907 (1972).
98. 117 CONG. REC. 31971 (1971).
99. In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Court rejected any absolute immunity for
intrastate commerce from the reach of the federal commerce power "But even if appellee's activity be
local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts substantial economic effect on interstate commerce. . . ." 317 U.S. 111, 125
(1942). The seminal commerce clause precedent, Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), also
acknowledged that power extended "to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but
not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do not affect other States, and with
which it is not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government." Id. at 195 (1824).
100. See note 52 and accompanying text supra.
101. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). Justice Brennan concurred: "Congressional
authority to enact the provisions of Title VII at issue in this case is found in Commerce Clause, Art. I, §
8. el. 3, and in § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 458. Justice Stevens separately concurred: "In
my opinion the commerce power is broad enough to support federal legislation regulating the terms
and conditions of state employment and, therefore, provides the necessary support for the 1972
Amendments to Title VII, even though Congress expressly relied on § 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 458.
102. Brief for Appellee at 55, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977),
reprinted in 10 Sup. Ct. L. Reprints (Lab. Ser.) No. 21 at 187 (1977).
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simple logic that a statute can be no broader than its Constitutional
base."'0 3 After Washington v. Davis, the fourteenth amendment can only
be read in accord with "the basic equal protection principle that the
invidious quality of a law claimed to be racially discriminatory must
ultimately be traced to a racially discriminatory purpose."'
0 4
The challengers appreciate the force of Morgan; however, that simple
logic asks how Congress can be enforcing a prohibition that does not exist
to be enforced. 10 5 Labeling the 1972 amendment to Title VII a
congressionally prescribed remedy that merely lowers the burden of proof
in Title VII cases is no answer. Any distinction between a congressionally
prescribed duty and a congressional remedy for a constitutionally
prescribed duty is illusory. The challengers are "not speaking in the narrow
103. Scott v. City of Anniston, Ala., 430 F. Supp. 508, 515 (N.D. Ala. 1977), rev'd, 597 F.2d 897
(5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert.filed, 48 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Sep. 7, 1979).
104. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976).
105. The challenge relies on an interpretation of section 5 enforcement power that is perfectly
congruent with section 1. Early judicial construction of the fourteenth amendment supports the
challenge. In The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), the Court used a rhetorical question to answer
an assertion of section 5 power "To enforce what? To enforce the prohibition. To adopt appropriate
legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited State laws and State acts, and thus to render
them effectively null, void, and innocuous. This is the legislative power conferred upon Congress, and
this is the whole of it." Id. at 11. The author of that opinion, Justice Bradley, had dissented in The
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 123-24 (1873), similarly arguing that the fourteenth
amendment would be self-executing: "Very little, if any, legislation on the part of Congress would be
required to carry the amendment into effect." Professor Monaghan finds merit in the contention:
"Section 5 is a limited, backstopping authority, allowing the national government to correct State
wrongs. The Civil Rights Cases ... are surely right on that point even if they take too narrowaview
of the substantive reach of congressional power under the fourteenth amendment." Monaghan,
Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REv. 1, 18 n. 100 (1975) (citation omitted). The
legislative history of the fourteenth amendment reveals rejection of a broad enforcement power. Bickel,
The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1, 57-60 & 60 n.115
(1955) ("Presumably the lesson taught by the defeat of the Bingham amendment had been learned.
Congress was not to have unlimited discretion, and it was not to have the leeway represented by
'necessary and proper' power.") (footnote omitted). See also J. JAMES, FRAMING THE FOURTENTH
AMENDMENT 50, 82-83 (1956).
Professor Bickel explains the more limited phrasing of enforcement power as a tactical
compromise using language "sufficiently elastic to permit reasonable future advances," Bickel, supra at
61, after there was "time and the chance to educate the public." Id. at 64. That explanation must,
however, be understood in the historical context of the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War.
The purpose of the fourteenth amendment was to "constitutionalize" an earlier statutory protection of
civil rights. Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round at Last. Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 293 (1969). The House Chair of the Joint Committee on Recon-
struction, the committee responsible for drafting the fourteenth amendment, voiced the fear that
subsequent Congresses could easily repeal by majority vote statutory protection for civil rights,
whereas a two-thirds majority would be needed to even begin a repeal of a constitutional amendment.
"[T]he first time that the South with their Copperhead allies obtain the command of Congress [the civil
rights statute] will be repealed." CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2459 (1866) (Rep. Stevens). A
Congress so distrustful of future Congresses would not likely grant them broad powers. Burt, Miranda
and Tile II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81, 93.
Regardless of legislative motivation, though, the language of section 5 surely suggests that some,
perhaps not perfect, congruity with section I was intended. Unlike substantive provisions whose
meaning is expandable because a transcendent concept underlies the transitory conception of their
framers, see R. DOWRKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-35 (1977), section 5 is a mechanical
provision with a more literal meaning. Cf..United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 779 (1966) (Brennan.
J., concurring) (The author of Morgan construes elements of the statutory crime of denying civil rights
"secured" by the fourteenth amendment, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976), to include any right that "emanates
from the Constitution [or] . .. finds its source in the Constitution.")
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sense of 'relief,' but rather in the broad sense of a'remedy for a wrong.' ,,106
Absent the wrong, claiming purely remedial rather than substantive
characterization does not decide the issue.
When Washington v. Davis told state and local governments "that a
law or other official act, without regard to whether it reflects a racially
discriminatory purpose" cannot be held "unconstitutional solely because it
has a racially disproportionate impact",'0 7 it established a constitutional
claim against any lower burden of proof. Consequently, a statutory burden
of proof that conflicts with the constitutional one cannot be justified as an
enforcement of the Constitution by the statute.
B. Meeting the Challenge
The challenge is more often ridiculed than seriously met. Federal
appellate courts have been unanimous: "Neither the Supreme Court nor
any circuit court has held that Title VII imposes different requirements
depending upon whether the suit is against a governmental employer or a
private litigant."108 Consensus among lower courts, however, has not
106. Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 11, County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440
U.S. 625 (1979), reprinted in 12 Sup. CT. L. REPRINTS (Lab. Ser.) No. 6A at 50 (1978). This argument
was stated by the respondents to the county's petition, yet its logic supports the challenger's position: if
the remedy is tied to the wrong, rather than a separate equitable notion of how an established wrong
should be rectified, then labeling Title VII remedial does not broaden the statutory reach beyond the
limited constitutional anchor of purposeful discrimination under the equal protection clause. Cf.
Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 752 (1974) ("absent an inter-district violation there is no basis foran
inter-district remedy" for de jure public school segregation).
In Davis, the challengers wanted to distinguish the remedial scope of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) from
that of Title VII. They relied on the distinction established in Johnson v. REA, 421 U.S. 545, 461
(1975): "[T]he remedies available underTitle VII and Sec. 1981, although related and although directed
to most of the same ends, are separate, distinct, and independent .. "To counter that argument, the
respondents emphasized that the remedies mentioned in Johnson were simply procedural whereas the
remedies they sought were substantive. The challengers are thus better served by jettisoning the
Johnson distinction and directly joining the issue.
As to § 1981, however, the scope may be tied not only to the fourteenth but also-to the thirteenth
amendment. See, e.g., Note, The Expanding Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination
and a Cloud on Affirmative Action, 90 HARV. L. REV. 412,426 (1976); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 168 n.8 (1976) (section 1981 was "drawn from both § 16 of the 1980 Act and § 1 of the 1866 Act.");
R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 22-48 (1977). Consequently, the challengers may lose under
either a remedy/ substantive dichotomy or a straight substantive analysis. But see County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 566 F.2d 1334, 1348-49 (9th Cir. 1977) (Wallace, J., dissenting) vacatedas moot, 440
U.S. 625 (1979). Dissenting in Davis, Justice Powell, joined by the Chief Justice, viewed the
impact/ intent issue under § 1981 as unsettled: "Weshould reach, rather than seek a questionable means
of avoiding, the important question-heretofore unresolved by this court-whether cases brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, like those brought underthe Fourteenth Amendment, require proof of racially
discriminatory intent or purpose." Id. at 637. One reading of Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 255
(1976) (Stevens, J. concurring), suggests this issue was resolved in that decision. Heiser, Intent v.
Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case of Race Discrimination
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 207, 228 (1979). In light of the thirteenth amendment
heritage of § 198 1, though, the issue would not likely be resolved by unfocused discussion. Cf. Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968) (Referring to 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976)), the Court
stressed that the thirteenth amendment" 'clothed Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and
proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery.' "(citation omitted).
107. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976).
108. Scott v. City of Anniston, Ala., 597 F.2d 897,899 (5th Cir. 1979),petitionforcert.filed,48
U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. Sept. 7, 1979). See, e.g., Rice v. City of St. Louis, 607 F.2d 791,794 (8th Cir.
1979); Harris v. White, 479 F. Supp. 996, 1002 (D. Mass. 1979); Brown v. New Haven Civ. Serv. Bd.,
474 F. Supp. 1256, 1259 (D. Conn. 1979).
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hindered the Supreme Court from reaching an opposite decision in other
Title VII cases,"0 9 and the rejectionists do advance an argument based on
Katzenbach v. Morgan.
In Morgan, the Supreme Court held: "The fourteenth amendment
empowers Congress to enact appropriate legislation establishing more
exacting requirements than those minimum safeguards provided in the
amendment."' 0 The rejectionists extrapolate from the holding a second
point: "Congress' power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to
enforce that amendment by 'appropriate legislation' is not limited to
prohibiting state action that itself violates the Constitution.""' Instead,
"Congress is authorized to enact more stringent standards than those
provided by the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments in order to carry out




1. The Morgan Power
Gauging what legislation is appropriate under section 5 begins with
the "classic formulation of the reach" of powers under the necessary and
proper clause: 13 "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter




Applying this formulation, the rejectionists conclude that Congress
plainly had "authority to determine that implementation of the equal
109. In General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 147 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Court
"reject[ed] the unanimous conclusion of all six Courts of Appeals that have addressed this question." In
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 244-45 & 244 n.12 (1976), the Court produced a laundry list of
circuit and district court opinions it disapproved, noting only that "[t]he cases impressively
demonstrate that there is another side to the issue."
110. 384 U.S. at 651.
I I1. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1372-73 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionforcert.filed,
48 U.S.L.W. 3013 (Jul. 12, 1979). The Morgan holding need not be so expansive. To say that the
fourteenth amendment by its own force establishes in § I a foundation that may be built upon by
congressional action pursuant to §5 is not to say that the building may proceed apart from the
foundation.
112. Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979), petition for cert. filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3154 (Sep. 7, 1979). Again, this reading of Morgan is not necessarily so. That Congress may
more strictly regulate pursuant to § 5 than the fourteenth amendment does by its own force in § I does
not mean Congress may regulate beyond the scope of§ I. The more defensible reading is that Congress
may regulate to fill in those gaps that a law in constitutional form naturally leaves. See Weems v. United
States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
113. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 n.9 (1966) ("By including § 5 the draftsman
sought to grant to Congress. by a specific provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same
broad powers expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause .... ) (footnote omitted). This
understanding of § 5 has been discredited. See note 105 supra. Even the breadth of the necessary and
proper clause is subject to a constitutional measure. Cf. Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S. 234. 254-55
(1960) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Of course, the Necessary and Proper Clause cannot be used to'expand'
powers which are otherwise constitutionally limited, but that is only to say that when an asserted power
is not appropriate to the exercise of an express power, to which all'necessary and proper' powers must
relate, the asserted power is not a 'proper' one."). Were § I of the fourteenth amendment an article I
congressional responsibility, the necessary and proper clause could not change the meaning of§ I by
enforcing it because that would be an expansion of § 1.
114. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819).
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protection clause required extension of the Griggs impact standard to state
and local governments."" 5 A rational relationship between that extension
and "the goal of enforcing the equal protection clause's prohibition of
discrimination"'1 6 is predicated upon the evidence before Congress that
pervasive discrimination existed in the public sector." 7 Congress could
properly "weight the competing policy considerations and determine that
public employees required the safeguards against discrimination given to
private employees by the Griggs standard." 8
The legislative history is replete with references to promoting equal
employment opportunity as both an end in itself and a means to equal
participation in and benefits from government. These references indicate
that Congress acted with the values of the equal protection clause in mind.
Congressional power in enforcing section 5 is plenary,1 9 and the policy of
imposing a discriminatory impact standard may not be second-guessed or
rejected by courts. Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke may well have spoken
for the other Justices on at least this point: "We have previously recognized
the special competence of Congress to make findings with respect to the
effects of identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority to
take appropriate remedial measures."' 20
2. The Definition in Washington v. Davis
Congressional power to determine whether impact discrimination
thwarted enforcement of the equal protection clause could not have been
precluded by the Washington v. Davis holding that ajudicial finding of a
115. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1373 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionforcert.filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3013 (Jul. 12, 1979). The legislative history of Title VII does reflect a congressionally
perceived need to extend the discriminatory impact standard of Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S.
424, 432 (1971). to public employers. See notes 58-65 and accompanying text supra.
116. Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367, 1373 (9th Cir. 1979),petitionforcert.filed, 48
U.S.L.W. 3013 (Jul. 12, 1979).
117. See notes 55-59 and accompanying text supra. A "special function of Congress [may be]
making determinations of legislative fact" to which the courts should defer. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112, 240 (1970) (Brennan, J., separate opinion). Accord, Cox, Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 106-07 (1966).
118. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416,423-24 (7th Cir. 1977) (citation omitted). Cf
Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 U. S. 356,371-72(1969) (Because"reasonable minds
may differ as to which of several remedial measures should be chosen," congressional balancing of
interests deserves judicial deference).
119. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (Section 5 represents "legislative authority
that is plenary within the terms ofthe constitutionalgrant.") (emphasis added). The modifying phrase
is often slighted as a truism; however, the boundaries of the constitutional grant in § 5 are set by § 1.
120. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302 n.41 (1978) (Powell, J., separate
opinion). The findings are amply present in the legislative history. See notes 55-65 and accompanying
text supra. Congress identified pervasive public sector employment discrimination and sought "to
insure that all citizens are treated equally in this country." Shawer v. Indiana Univ., 605 F.2d 1161,
1164 (3d Cir. 1979) (per curiam). That insurance was based on both types of denial of equal protection:
discriminatory exclusion from jobs and discriminatory delivery of services. See notes 81-85 and
accompanying text supra. Cf United States v. State of New York, 475 F. Supp. 1103, 1109 (N.D.N.Y.
1979) ("In a democratic society. a police force that includes a reasonable proportion of members from
the various groups of people that it serves will have a better image with the public [and] will better be
able to carry out its law enforcement functions. ... ).
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constitutional violation requires a showing of discriminatory purpose.121
The Court distinguished the constitutional definition of discrimination
from a statutory one: "However, in our view, extension of the rule beyond
those areas where it is already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the
field of public employment, should await legislative presumption."
122
Indeed, one phrasing of the question in Washington v. Davis is whether the
standard of Title VII should be read into the equal protection clause1 3 To
this, the Court directly responded: "We have never held that the
constitutional standard for adjudicating claims of invidious discrimina-
tion is identical to the standard applicable under Title VII, and we decline
to do so today.' 24
Congressional power to impose statutory liability for employment
practices with a discriminatory impact is at least "unshaken by the
Washington decision 125 and the decision might be construed as "expressly
refut[ing] the contention . .. that discriminatory purpose or intent must
be demonstrated in a Title VII case."'
126
3. The Fourteenth Amendment
Since Washington v. Davis does not preclude a congressional
definition of the equal protection clause, the Morgan criteria for
measuring section 5 power is satisfied if the congressional definition is
supportable as a matter of law. While Congress could not abandon the
equal protection clause under the guise of enforcing it, Morgan suggests
that judicial deference will be shown to any fair reading of the scope of the
equal protection clause. The legislative history of the fourteenth
amendment supports construing the equal protection clause as a means to
"secure to all persons within the United States practical freedom.' ' 27
During the Reconstruction Era following the Civil War, the
121. The rejectionists agree that Washington v. Davis established "the constitutional reach
which [the Supreme Court] ascribed to equal protection," but further note that the Court "in no way
suggested that the power of the Congress pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment is so circumscribed
that the Congress itself may not apply the same Title VII standards to all employers, private and
governmental alike." Vanguard Just. Soe'y, Inc. v. Hughes, 471 F.2d 670, 701 (D. Md. 1979). In
Dothard V. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,331 n. 14 (1977), the Court rejected what was "perhaps a variation
of their constitutional challenge" that more deference was due the state's employment conditions by
approvingly citing congressional "intent that the same Title VII principles be applied to governmental
and private employers alike." The key phrase, though, remains "the constitutional reach." In
Washington v. Davis, the Court defined that reach; therefore, at least the suggestion exists that
Congress may not overreach when its objective is enforcement of the equal protection clause.
122. 426 U.S. at 248.
123. Id. at 236.
124. Id. at 239.
125. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 509-10 (8th Cir.
1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1978).
126. United States v. City of Chicago, 573 F.2d 416, 421 (7th Cir. 1977).
127. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull). The senator was referring
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976), but "the principles of the civil rights bill (Act of 1866)" had been
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment. Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24, 32 n. 13 (1948).
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vanquished states were reluctant to accord full and equal rights to former
slaves.' 28 A set of "Black Codes" was passed129 that, though generally
neutral on their face, operated to the disadvantage of the former slaves. 30
The framers of the fourteenth amendment had no illusions that the Civil
War had changed deep-seated feelings about racial equality. Aware of the
"Black Codes," Congress first amended the Constitution and then re-
enacted one section of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now codified as 42
U.S.C. section 1981, originally passed pursuant to the thirteenth
amendment in response to the "Black Codes."13' The fourteenth
amendment "was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of
all the civil rights that under the Law are enjoyed by white persons, and to
give to that race the protection of the general government, in that
enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States."' 3 2 Section 1981
became one method of enforcing the fourteenth amendment: "There is
very little importance in the general declaration of abstract truths and
principles unless they can be carried into effect, unless the persons who are
to be affected by them have some means of availing themselves of their
benefits.' 33 In sum, the Reconstruction Era produced state laws that
perpetuated "under other names and in other forms a system of
involuntary servitude."' 34 Enacted in this context, the equal protection
clause could be interpreted by Congress to reach discriminatory impact.'35
128. See generally J. TEN BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE Fourteenth AMENDMENT
163 (1951); Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 17
& n.42 (1955); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323,
1323 (1952); Kohl, The Civil Rights Act of 1866, Its Hour Come Round At Last: Jones v. Alfred H.
Mayer Co., 55 VA. L. REV. 272, 278 (1969).
129. The codes were primarily oriented in fears that newly emancipated slaves would wander the
countryside without jobs and commit violent acts against the slave-holding class. Thus, vagrancy and
apprenticeship laws were enacted. Kohl, supra note 128, at 278.
130. For example, the conditions on employment, "in the case of South Carolina, Alabama, and
Louisiana, literally applied to all laborers regardless of race.... " Brief Amicus Curiae for
N.A.A.C.P. Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. at 19, County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625
(1979). reprinted in, 12 Sup. CT. L. REPRINTS (Lab. Ser.) No. 6A at 53 (1978).
131. CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong., 2d Sess. 3658 (1870) (remarks of Sen. Stewart). See Karst,
Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 12 & n.58
(1977).
132. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880).
133. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 474 (1866) (Sen. Trumbull).
134. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1124 (1866) (Rep. Cook).
135. Challengers of a discriminatory impact standard for state and local governmental
employers recognize that the Black Codes were neutral in form but disparate in impact. They argue,
however, that "it was obvious to Congress as well as the military occupational government that these
statutes were enacted with a purposeful discriminatory intent and were designed to place the newly free
blacks in a position subservient to their former masters." Reply Brief for Appellant at 5, County of Los
Angeles v. Davis. 440 U.S. 625 (1979). reprinted in 12 Sup. CT. L. REPRINTS (Lab. Ser.) No. 6A at 223
(1978). The Brief Amicus Curiae of the Equal Employment Advisory Council in Davis likewise argued
that the Reconstruction Era "was a period of rampant, overt discrimination; the concept of
consequential discrimination resulting from the disproportionate impact of otherwise racially neutral
conduct was still a century into the future." Id. at 28, 12 Sup. CT. L. REPRINTS (Lab. Ser.) No. 6A at 326.
While arguments over how the 39th Congress perceived the Black Codes persist, they can hardly be
dispositive of the meaning of the equal protection clause after Washington v. Davis.
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4. Burden of Proof under Title VII
In Griggs, the Supreme Court recognized that "Congress directed the
thrust of the Act [Title VII] to the consequences of employment practices,
not simply the motivation."13 6 The congressional objective "was to achieve
equality of employment opportunities and to remove barriers that have
operated in the past to favor an identifiable group.' 37 Congress adopted a
disparate impact standard to achieve that objective:
Disparate impact doctrine as first laid down in Griggs was clearly designed to
ensure more perfect realization of the beneficient purposes of Title VII by
making plain that discriminatory consequences as well as discriminatory
intent fell under the ban of this remedial legislation, and by providing a
relatively easy burden ofprimafacie proof of discriminatory consequences to
overcome difficulties that might normally obtain in proving "discrimination
in employment" vel. non.138
In providing a statutory burden of proof that was lighter than one im-
posed by the Constitution, Congress broadened the enforcement of equal
employment opportunity. "[C]ongressional adjustment of the burdens of
proof in litigation is a familiar method of enforcing the post-Civil War
amendments which [the Supreme] Court has upheld in the context of
voting rights.' 39
Morgan exemplifies such an adjustment. In a prior case, the Supreme
Court had rejected a facial challenge to literacy tests used to qualify
voters. The argument was that the tests were "in all circumstances
136. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1972).
137. Id. at 429-30.
138. Wright v. National Archives and Rec. Serv., 609 F.2d 702,712-13 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc).
The challengers may argue, based on General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976), that, contrary to
Griggs, Congress did not adopt a discriminatory impact standard. In Gilbert, the term "discrimina-
tion" in § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1) (1976), was defined by analogy to the fourteenth
amendment. 429 U.S. at 145. Because the constitutional issue of pregnancy exclusion from employee
health benefits plans had been decided in Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494-97 (1974). reading a
constitutional definition of discrimination into Title VII produced the same holding as in Geduldig.
Using the same rationale, the Washington v. Davis constitutional holding would find a parallel inTitle
VII.
Gilbert did not, however, proceed under § 703(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (1976), the
provision in Griggs. 429 U.S. at 137. That provision establishes "an unlawful employment practicefor
an employer . . . to limit or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race .... " Indeed, Gilbert recognized
that § 703(a) (2) created liability for impact discrimination and found that "there is no proof that the
package is in fact worth more to men than to women." Id. at 138. Although Gilbert has been fairly
criticized for measuring the impact on risks, rather than the impact on individuals, id. at 155 (Brennan,
J., dissenting); id. at 161-62 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The classification is between persons who
face a risk of pregnancy and those who do not."), the furthest reach of the opinion on its face is to
construe the § 703(a)(I) term, "or otherwise to discriminate," by reference to the constitutional concept
of discrimination. Gilbert does not tie Title VII discrimination to a constitutional definition. See also,
Recent Developments in Women's Rights, Sex Discrimination and Insurance Planning: The Rights of
Pregnant Men and Women under General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 22 ST. Louis U. L.J. 101.126 (1978).
139. Brief for Appellee at 53 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977),
reprinted in 10 Sup. CT. L. REPRINTS (Lab. Ser.) No. 21 at 185 (1976) (citations omitted).
140. Lassiter v. Northampton Election Bd., 360 U.S., 45, 54 (1959).
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prohibited by the" equal protection clause and the fifteenth amendment. 141
Congress subsequently enacted the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and
proscribed literacy tests. 142 Any person who "successfully completed the
sixth primary grade" was conclusively presumed sufficiently literate to
vote.1 43 Prior to the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court's decision
required a person to show that a challenged literacy test was dis-
criminatory as applied; that is, "employed to perpetuate that discrimina-
tion" constitutionally forbidden. 44 Morgan upheld the substitution of a
statutory conclusive presumption for a constitutional burden of proof.45
The rejectionists conclude that Congress can do likewise with Title VII.
C. Criticizing Rejection of the Challenge
Intuitively, the state and local government employers' challenge is
unappealing. The history of discrimination in the United States, so
pointedly drawn in Justice Marshall's opinion in Bakke, 146 compels
disdain for any employer, especially a government employer, who engages
in discrimination. That the discrimination is subtly based on impact rather
than patently founded in intent makes no difference to the victim.
147
Nevertheless, the merit of the challenge must be analyzed separate from a
preordained conclusion. 148 Analysis begins with congressional power
under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment. That power is "plenary
141. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 649 (1966).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 1973a-p (1976).
143. § 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e)(2) (1976).
144. Lassiter v. Northampton City Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. at 53. The Court was referring to
the fifteenth amendment guaranty that "[t]he right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be
denied . . . on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONsT. amend. XV, §
1. Lassiter was brought pursuant to both the fourteenth and fifteenth amendments, and the
analytical point is unchanged by the context of the quote. 360 U.S. at 50. Accord, Katzenbach v.
Morgan. 384 U.S. at 649.
145, 384 U.S. at 654 ("Congress might well have questioned, in light of the many exemptions
provided, and some evidence suggesting that prejudice played a prominent role in the enactment of the
requirement" of a literacy test whether discriminatory purpose lies at the heart of the requirement.)
(footnotes omitted).
146. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 387-397 (1978) (Marshall, J., separate
opinion).
147. In a play on the aphorism about a dog's capacity to distinguish variations in human
conduct. Professor Karst explains that "[o]ne who is stumbled over often enough may,
understandably, notice that those cumulative impacts bear a certain functional resemblance to kicks."
Karst. Foreword: Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 51 (1977).
148. Prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court bench, and while he was thus insulated from
the reality of judicial decision-making at that level, Benjamin N. Cardozo distinguished the legal
process from the political one:
[The judge] is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty or of
goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is not to yield to
spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion
informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system ....
B. CARDOZO. THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921). The sentiment is sound though its
fulfillment be unattainable in a judiciary that manifests the same prejudices as the societyit serves. To
the extent that written public opinions encourage the Cardozo ideal judiciary, however,
commentators, and even advocates, must play an objective analytical game.
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within the terms of the constitutional grant." 149 Legislation that does not
"enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions" of the equal
protection clause may not bejustified by the power granted in section 5.50
1. The Morgan Power
When "[c]orrectly viewed, section 5 is a positive grant of legislative
power authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in determining
whether and what legislation is needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment."'151 Deference to a congressional judgment about
the equal protection clause is premised on the existence of the objective:
securing the guarantee of the clause. Beyond that premise, courts may not
closely scrutinize a congressional determination of either the means or the
ends identified as components of the guarantees.152  But, absent that
premise, Congress is without power to exercise its discretion.
Professor Tribe has observed that "subsequent Court decisions reveal
substantial uncertainty as to Morgan's validity; similarly the commen-
tators are undecided as to whether the opinion is or is not heresy."' 53 Both
issues are not of direct concern here; instead, it is the application of
Morgan to Title VII that will resolve the challenge over discriminatory
impact. Yet, in applying Morgan, its validity and heresy come into play.
"The starting point for most judicial and scholarly discourse about section
5 is that the provision means only what it says, and that Congress' power
pursuant to section 5 is restricted to the enforcement of the fourteenth
amendment's substantive provisions."' 154 At that point, validity and
orthodoxy seem assured.
149. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
150. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
151. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966) (emphasis added). The Morgan holding
has been described as construing section 5 to grant Congress power to define the guarantees of the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Burt, Miranda and Title 11. A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT.
REV. 81, 132 ("[T]o acknowledge that Congress has some role in defining the constitutional imperatives
that limit its own authority is truly to turn Marbury v. Madison on its head, but that somersault was
implicit in Morgan itself ") The emphasized portion of the Morgan language is the starting point for
rejecting such a construction. Morgan held that Congress could act to secure, not define, the guarantees
of the fourteenth amendment. Implicitly, the guarantees exist apart from the enforcement power
flowing from the view of Section 5 in Morgan.
152. See Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion ofHuman Rights. 90
HARV. L. REV. 91, 104 (1966). In Morgan, the Court used avery deferential scrutiny- "It is not for us to
review the congressional resolution of these factors [referring to the extent of discrimination. remedies.
and impact on state interests]. It is enough that we be able to perceive a basis upon which the Congress
might resolve the conflict as it did." 394 U.S. at 653. Cf. New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,303 (1976)
(deference to economic legislation).
153. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION LAW 29 (1978). Similar comments describe the
fractionated handling of Morgan in Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), as "a constitutional law
disaster area," Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN.
L. REV. 603, (1975), and "a state of analytical disarray occasioned in part by the issue of section 5
authority." Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1212, 1232 (1978) (footnote omitted).
154. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 1212, 1237 (1978). This starting point would make a fine finish line but for doubt that a literal
reading of section 5 might contradict the Morgan decision. There can be no doubt, though, that at a
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Why analysis need be confused beyond that point is not readily
apparent. The likely culprit is a misguided claim about the meaning of that
starting point. In Morgan, the state asserted that the judiciary, either
before or after congressional action, must agree that the congressionally
proscribed state action violated the equal protection clause.t55 The Court
rejected that notion. 156 Section 5 enlarged the power of Congress to "make
the [Civil War] amendments fully effective."' 5 7 Congress is authorized to
decide, on its own, whether state action violates the equal protection
clause. Although courts should require minimum rationality under the
McCulloch formulation quoted above, they may not defer to an
inconsistent judgment about what the Constitution means. The formula-
tion requires that the end "be within the scope of the constitution" and the
means "consistent with the letter and spirit of he constitution.', 158 That
judgment will initially be made by Congress, but "[ilt is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 1 59 It is
too late in the jurisprudential day to doubt that ajudicial interpretation of
the Constitution trumps a conflicting congressional one.
The courts may, and probably should, be deferential to the initial
determination of Congress that a guarantee of the equal protection clause
is implicated by a particular state action. But, "it is deference not
capitulation which is espoused in [Morgan].'60 Morgan can best be
understood when a distinction is made between judicial definition and
minimum "[i]n that section Congress is expressly granted authority to enforce 'by appropriate
legislation' the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S.
445, 456 (1976). Haggling over how the "substantive provisions" are to be defined need not implicate
differing interpretations of the clear language in section 5, and the doubt perceived from the Morgan
holding can be reconciled with the clear language.
155. 384 U.S. at 648. TheAttorney General for the State of New York argued that the challenged
statute "cannot be sustained as appropriate legislation to enforce the Equal Protection Clause unless
thejudiciary decides-even with theguidance of a congressionaljudgment-that the application of the
English literacy requirement prohibited by [the statute] is forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause."
Id.
156. To the Attorney General's argument, the majority opinion tersely responded: "We
disagree." Id.
157. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. (10 Otto) 339, 345 (1880), quoted in, Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. at 648 (1966).
158. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,421 (1819). The quoted phrases apply to
both the purported enabling provisions of the Constitution and other constitutional provisions that
restrict the power exercised. In McCulloch, discussion of the power granted by the necessary and
proper clause. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 18, focused on the tension between two concepts: first, "that
the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended," 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) at 482, and second, "that it is a constitution we are expounding," id. at 474, which was
"intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human
affairs." Id. at 478. This tension frames the McCulloch formulation and indicates that real scrutiny,
whether denominated minimal or strict, of the end and means is constitutionally mandated.
159. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137, 177 (1803). Morgan has been read as a step
back from Marbur'. "The Court is suggesting that, to some extent at least, § 5 exempts the Fourteenth
Amendment from the principle of Court-Congress relationships expressed by Marbury v. Madison,
that the judiciary is the final arbiter of the Constitution." Burt, Miranda and itle Ik A Morganatic
Marriage. 1969 Sup. Cr. REV. 81. 84 (footnote omitted).
160. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 91 HARV.
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application. Although the distinction is not absolute, each function being
performed as an incident of the other, the primary function at work in any
decision can still be identified.1 61 When courts define the Constitution,
Congress is bound by the definition; when they merely apply the Consti-
tution, Congress is free to apply it differently.
In Morgan, the state flouted the Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections1 62 decision. Lassiter had rejected a facial challenge to
literacy tests, holding that North Carolina's judgment about voting
qualifications was "an allowable one measured by constitutional
standards.1 63 Were the tests "employed to perpetuate" discrimination or
even presented to the Court in a context that "made clear that a literacy
requirement was merely a device to make racial discrimination easy," the
tests would be unconstitutional.164 In Morgan, the court declined the state
invitation "to determine whether the New York English literacy
requirement as applied to deny the right to vote to a person who
successfully completed the sixth grade in a Puerto Rican school violates
the Equal Protection Clause. ,1 65 The judgment had been made by
Congress; it had not been forclosed by Lassiter. A definition of the
guarantee in the equal protection clause was not critical in Lassiter; rather,
"constitutional standards" were merely applied to a record that,
intriguingly, charged no "influence" of use of the literacy tests in a context
of racially discriminatory voting practices.1 66 Morgan has been so
L. REV. 1212, 1230 (1978) (footnote omitted). Professor Tribe views this power sharing as part of the
structural design:
[There is a] clear constitutional message: despite the growth offederal judicial power, the
Constitution remains a fundamentally democratic document, open to competing inter-
pretations limited only by the values which inform the Constitution's provisions themselves,
and by the complex political process that the Constitution creates-a process which on
various occasions gives the Supreme Court, Congress, the President, or the states, the last
word in constitutional debate.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 33 (1978). This observation is fine as a message but
inadequate as a resolution of conflicting claims over the allocation of power to define the Constitution.
What Professor Tribe remonstrates about is a knee-jerk reaction to judicial supremacy whenever a
conflict arises. For example, legislative power exists under the commerce clause, U. S. CON5T. art I, § 8,
cl. 3, "above the judicially established floor," Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process
and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606 (1975), if thejudiciary interprets the clause in the face
of a dormant Congress. See, e.g., Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prod., 306 U.S. 346, 351-52
(1939). Cf. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519, 557-78 (1978) (Congress, not the judiciary, may choose whether to try nuclear energy as a
source of power). The tougher issue arises when the power sharing is threatened by a direct conflict
about the judicially established ceiling.
161. This dichotomy is not a profound one; however, it is analytically serviceable. Cf.
Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional, Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 31 (1975) ("Plainly, any
distinction between constitutional exegesis and common law cannot be analytically precise,
representing as it does, differences of degree. But I hope that we may be left with something more than
the 'expert feel of lawyers,' or 'I know it when I see it,' although I do not denigrate the importance of
either feeling in this process.").
162. 360 U.S. 45 (1959).
163. Id. at 53.
164. Id.
165. 384 U.S. at 649 (emphasis supplied).
166. Lassiter v. Northampton City Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. at 53.
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construed by three current members (one a dissenter in Morgan) of the
Court:
The Court's opinion made clear that Congress could impose on the States a
remedy for the denial of equal protection that elaborated upon the direct
command of the Constitution, and that it could override state laws on the
ground that they were in fact used as instruments of invidious discrimination
even though a court in an individual lawsuit might not have reached that
factual conclusion.
167
Justice Stevens also seems to support the distinction between definition
and application. In Fitzpatrick, he was "not sure that the 1972
Amendments [to Title VII] were 'needed to secure the guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' ,,161
The congressional choice of means in applying the Constitution is
seldom questioned upon a review under the minimum rationality
standard. "[T]he drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a
legislative task and an unavoidable one."'169 In a like manner, con-
gressional selection of ends, short of a selection conflicting with a
definition excluding the end from the reach of the constitutional provision,
is discretionary. Congress may decide, for example, that equal protection
of the laws includes equal employment opportunity as an end and may
choose any means rationally related to that end so long as both the end and
means are consistent with the controlling definition of the equal protection
clause. 70
167. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 296 (1970) (Steward, J., concurring and dissenting in
part, joined by Burger, C. J. and Blaekmun, J.) (emphasis supplied).
168. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 458 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring). His concurrence
also questioned whether a violation of the fourteenth amendment had been proven; however, he argued
that Congress could impose liability on the states through power provided by the commerce clause. Id.
169. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
170. Congress has two pegs upon which to hang its interpretation of the equal protection clause.
Not only may discrimination be defined to include employment practices with a disparate impact, but
equal protection may also be defined to include governmental services that employ proportional
numbers of minorities and therefore more equitably deliver services. See notes 82-85 and
accompanying text supra. While the definition of discrimination is foreclosed by Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976), the viability of the second approach is not settled. May discriminatory impact be
prohibited because it indirectly denies equal protection to governmental services? Although there is a
strong argument, based on deference to legislative findings, supporting an affirmative response to that
question, the evolving judicial definition of the equal protection clause suggests a negative response.
First, the claim would be that otherwise equal employment opportunity, in the sense that
discriminatory purpose is absent, has an impact on delivery of government services. Purposeful
discrimination in government services would clearly be proscribed; impact discrimination would not.
In Washington v. Davis, the Court included in its wholesale rejection of "cases [that] impressively
demonstrate that there is another side to the issue" one on delivery of services. 426 U.S. at 244 n.12.
Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1977), aff'don reh'g en banc, 461 F.2d 1171 (1972)
(per curiam). Hawkins was decided on the theory that "it is not necessary to prove intent, motive or
purpose to discriminate on the part of city officials." Id. at 1172. Were a challenge relying on impact
theory to delivery of services directly made, it would fail under the equal protection clause. An indirect
challenge relying on the impact of employment practices as a cause for discriminatory impact in
delivery of services would be equally ill-fated.
Second. the core claim in services delivery cases derived from impact theory is that unequal results
have been provided. Yet, the Supreme Court now deems it "a settled rule that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees equal laws, not equal results." Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273
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The brunt of commentary on Morgan has been on the "ratchet"
theory.'71 The Morgan majority noted that Congress had "no power to
restrict, abrogate, or dilute" guarantees in the fourteenth amendment.
172
Once Congress had discretion under section 5 to enforce guarantees in the
fourteenth amendment, the pundits were hard at intellectual work either
justifying a one-way ratchet or denouncing the decision. 73 The time has
come to bury that ratchet. Theories justifying the ratchet of begging the
question are commonly cited, 74 yet none challenges the fallacy that
(1979). Put differently, all citizens have a right of equal opportunity to receive government services, but
that right does not guarantee elimination of the "many inequalities [that] are consistent with the notion
that each of us is entitled to respect as a person, a participating member of society." Karst, Foreword:
Equal Citizenship under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1, 9 (1977).
The critical issue for any claim is whether opportunity has been equally provided, with the impact
being "merely" a coincidence. To justify the disparity in delivery of governmental services in Hawkins,
the town argued that neutral criteria, like the special needs of particular neighborhoods or traffic usage,
produced the discriminatory results. 437 F.2d at 1280-90. Had that been true, as the district court found
but upon which was quite rightly reversed, the impact would have been a function of realities that,
while anchored in past societal discrimination, were germane to choices about delivery of services.
Those choices would treat each recipient of services with equal respect to the extent the recipients
apparent status, e.g., resident of an older neighborhood or a less traveled one, was taken into account.
At bottom, Washington v. Davis adopts this concept of equality.
The concept has been soundly criticized, see notes 41 and 42 supra, and is particularly defectivein
purporting to treat with equal respect disproportionately affected persons. The apparent status of a
recipient of services is a superficial one. That status is derived from deeper causes, baggage that each
recipient carries with him or her. Only when government delivers services with cognizance and
deference to that baggage is true equal respect and dignity accorded. See R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY 180 (1977). Consequently, "government has an obligation, an affirmative duty, to pursue its
legitimate interests by means of laws selected and fine-tuned for the purpose of avoiding unnecessary
intrusion on the interests of racial minorities." Perry, The Disproportionate Impact Theory of Racial
Discrimination, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 556-57 (1977).
Finally, the power of Congress to render a legislative finding ofa violation of the equal protection
clause is not eviscerated byjudicial parameters restricting that power. That power is in the first instance
independent of the judicial role in enforcing the equal protection clause. "Even if discrimination solely
for [disparity in delivery of services] is not a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment that the Court
could itself strike down, because the state does not draw lines in terms of race, still it is within the larger
area of violations which may be declared by Congress." Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication
and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 120 (1966). But the judiciary not only
enforces the equal protection clause, it also polices congressional enactments under that clause. This
judicial review function differs from the shared judicial and legislative power to enforce the clause.
Thus, the analysis by Professor Cox is correct but does not address the conflict between judicial
definition, rather than application, of the Constitution and a legislative definition and/ or application,
both of which are controlled by the judicial definition, even though judicial application would leave
room for either legislative power to act independently.
171. The ratchet metaphor was introduced in Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due
Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 606-07 (1975). According to WEBSTER'S THIRD
NEW INT'L DICTIONARY 1884 (1966), a "ratch" is a "notched bar with which a pawl or click works to
prevent reversal of motion."
172. 384 U.S. at 651 n.10. The footnote was important to the majority's analysis because it
refuted Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion that under the holding he did "not see why Congress should
not be able as well to exercise its § 5 'discretion' by enacting statutes so as in effect to dilute equal
protection and due process decisions of the Court." Id. at 668.
173. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 265-72 (1978); Burt, Miranda and
7itle II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REV. 81; Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret
Due Process and Equal Protection, 27 STAN. L. REV. 603 (1975); Cox, The Role of Congress in
Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REV. 199 (1971); Cox, Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91 (1966).
174. Professor Tribe treats the issue as a false one and suggests that both internal constitutional
restraints, particularly the Bill of Rights, and external democratic restraints, like federalism, satisfy any
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"enforcement" means "expansion." Morgan does not operate as a ratchet.
Enforcement is not a ratchet-like exercise because the Constitution is not
twisted in one direction rather than another. The Constitution is enforced
like a vise. It firmly grips whatever comes between its jaws. The width of the
need to keep Congress from restricting under the guise of enforcing. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 272 n.61 (1978). That position, while undoubtedly true on its face, begs the
question of just what section 5 means.
Professor Cox defers to "congressional supremacy over the judiciary in the areas of legislative
factfinding and evaluation," Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of
Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REv. 91, 107 (1966), and reads Morgan as leaving"no doubt that Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress power to deal with conduct outside the scope of section
1," Id. at 103. That reading is to be limited, however, to congressional "power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment to extend the practical application of the amendment's broad constitutional
guarantees upon its own findings of fact, characterizations, and resolution of questions of proportion
and degree." Cox, The Role of Congress in Constitutional Determinations, 40 U. CIN. L. REv. 199,238
(197 1). In seeming contradiction to the broader reading, Professor Cox has settled on a circumscribed
interpretation:
Nothing in Morgan suggested that the Court should defer to Congress in the process of
deriving the applicable legal standard from the document and other sources of law; the
opinion seemed to require Congress to apply the same standard as the Court, merely leaving it
free to apply the standard differently where the application turned upon questions of fact.
Id. at 234. The problem, of course, is one Professor Cox recognized: "When the definition depends
upon appraisal of the facts," the rationale for deferring to Congress remains. Cox, Foreword:
Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARV. L. REV. 91, 106 n.86
(1966). Under his approach, Professor Cox would be hard-pressed to reconcile a discriminatory impact
standard under amendments to Title VII that were based on the fourteenth amendment with a
fourteenth amendment that was controlled by Washington v. Davis. If Congress is free to apply that
standard differently, then the standard has no meaning. Only when both the courts and Congress are
engaged in applying the same standard is judicial deference to the legislature imperative. Similarly,
only when both the courts and Congress are engaged in defining the same standard is legislative
deference to the judiciary imperative.
Professor Cohen raises two barriers to resolving the ratchet problem. First, he rejects a "remedy-
interpretation distinction" as too limited to explain why Congress may expand but not restrict equal
protection guarantees. Cohen, Congressional Power to Interpret Due Process and Equal Protection,"
27 STAN. L. REV. 603, 608 (1975). Whether a remedy is involved would "turn on both the ostensible
congressional theory and the legislative facts supporting that theory;" therefore, the distinction is
unworkable because the ratchet could be used to move in two directions depending on legislative
characterization. Id. at 608-09. Moreover, the distinction is less exclusive than a definition/application
dichotomy because remedies may contain a substantive aspect. Second, Professor Cohen suggests a
federalist approach that would require judicial deference to"a congressionaljudgment resolving at the
national level and issue that could-without constitutional objection-be decided in the same way at
the state level." Id. at 614. He concludes "that the enforcement power under the 14th amendment
insofar as it involves disputed issues of interpreting section 2, is a power to legislate only at the
margins." Id. at 618-19. The problem with this analysis is determining where the margins are. Professor
Cohen uses the example of Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), for the proposition that were
Morgan to have continuing vitality, "Congress should have the power to create a newsman's privilege
binding against the states." 27 STAN. L. REV. at 619. Under his federalist approach and a reading of
Branzburg asjudicial deference to legislative line-drawing, Professor Cohen would have Congress hold
the same power as states did to enact a privilege. That power would not, however, flow from
enforcement of the first amendment. Branzburg held that the first amendment "does not reach so far aq
to override the interest of the public in ensuring that neither reporter nor source is invading the rights of
other citizens through reprehensible conduct forbidden to all other persons." 408 U.S. at 691-92. The
Supreme Court defined the first amendment to include protection of news-gathering, id. at 681, then
applied that protection to countervailing societal obligations "of a citizen to appear before a grand jury
or at trial, pursuant to a subpoena, and give what information he possesses." Id. at 686. Professor
Cohen's conclusion as to congressional power is probably correct but not instructive about section 5
power. Congress would not merely be enforcing the first amendment, it would be balancing law
enforcement interests against first amendment ones. While quite a chunk of traditionally reserved
police power would be rather cavalierly displaced by a national balancing, that is a federalism question,
not an enforcement one. See Dixon. Newsmen's Privilege by Federal Legislation: Within
Congressional Power' I HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 39, 39 (1974). The reason Congress has the
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vise remains for the courts to decide ultimately, with Congress sometimes
playing a secondary role in defining the width and a co-equal role in
applying the vise.'75
The dissent in Morgan wrongly applied the right rationale. Justice
Harlan wrote that "it is a judicial question whether the condition with
which Congress has thus sought to deal is in truth an infringement of the
Constitution, something that is the necessary prerequisite to bringing the
section 5 power into play at all.' ' 176 That is an accurate statement when read
to mean that a guarantee of the Constitution must exist to be enforced.
Justice Harlan probably meant his statement that way because he read
Lassiter as foreclosing congressional proscription of literacy tests. 177 Thus,
he concluded, "[i]n effect the Court reads section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment as giving Congress the power to define the substantive scope
of the Amendment."'78 He could not have meant that Congress may never
initially or without minimal review decide whether a particular state action
"is in truth an infringement"'179 because he approvingly cited precedent in
enforcement power is not simply that balancing of interests was involved in Branzburg but ratherthat
the first amendment was first defined, then applied in a way consistent with congressional power.
Finally, Professor Burt agrees that any remedial/ interpretive distinction is shallow: "Clearlysuch
[remedial] power has broad substantive impact. To grant or withhold such remedies dictates the
effective substance of the rights." Burt, Miranda and Tie RI: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT.
REv. 81, 84. His complaint is that Morgan offers little firm guidance and uses instead "flexible notions
[under which] the Court could approve congressional action that reshaped Court doctrine to make it
responsive to conflicting interests in a manner that the Court itself might not comfortably be able to
reach." Id. at 121. With practical institutional restraints being the only governor, Professor Burt reads
Morgan as leaving Marbury v. Madison behind. His paradigm is Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966), and the Court's willingness to yield to the"creative rule-making capacities" of Congress and the
states "so long as they are fully as effective ... in informing accused persons of their right of silence
and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it." Id. at 490. What the Court did in Miranda
was first to define the fifth amendment privilege to be available outside of criminal court proceedings
and to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way,
thereby establishing a constitutional minimum neither Congress nor the states can intrude upon, and
then to apply that definition in ajudicial framework that invite differing applications, consistent with
the definition. Contrary to Professor Burt, there was no "somersault" of Marbury by Morgan, 1969
SUp. CT. REv. at 132; rather, Morgan was an exercise in parallel bars.
175. This relationship between the court and Congress is explained in Sager, Fair Measure: The
Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional Norms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1241 (1978):
"[O]ccasion for federal judicial invalidation is presented when a congressional enactment pursuant to
section 5 is based upon a broader reading ofa substantive norm of the fourteenth amendment than that
which the Court has made and the more limited Supreme Court interpretation of the applicable
provision is firmly rooted in analytical rather than institutional perceptions." Professor Sager
illustrates his point by distinguishing between a holding that "X clause stops here" and one that "X
clause does not extend this far, at any event." Id. at 1242 (footnote omitted). Definition of a
constitutional provision would be analytical, whereas application of the provision would be limited by
lack of political responsiveness, absence of judicially manageable and enforceable standards, and the
"legislative" nature of interest balancing. Id. at 1217-18 & nn. 11-13 and commentators cited therein.
Cf. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1, 23 (1975) (Courts
sometimes establish "rules that are admittedly not integral parts of the Constitution and that go beyond
its minima requirements.")
176. 384 U.S. at 666 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 668.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 669. Justice Harlan distinguished Morgan from Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964), Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), and South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). Those cases involved legislative records supporting the
congressional judgment about a constitutional violation.
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which "a congressional estimate, based upon its determination of
legislative facts,"' 80 justified an exercise of section 5 power. His major
objection to the Voting Rights Act was that "[t]here is simply no legislative
record supporting such hypothesized discrimination" as Congress relied
on in banning literacy tests.' Without that record, Congress would have
been in conflict with the part of the Lassiter decision that defined the equal
protection clause as excluding a facial challenge to literacy tests.
The majority in Morgan deferred to congressional findings on two
points: "nondiscriminatory treatment by government"'8 2 and "elimination
of an invidious discrimination."'' 8 3 On each point, the majority ruled it
sufficient that they could "perceive a basis upon which" Congress might
act. 84 A formulation that was minimally rational calls for no greater
scrutiny. The majority did not, contrary to Justice Harlan's dissent,
surrender judicial "power to define the substantive scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment."' 8 5 Instead, the majority approved Congress' acceptance of
the invitation implicit in Lassiter: bring literacy tests used in a context of
racially discriminatory voting practice, and the equal protection clause will
bar them.
186
. 2. The Definition in Washington v. Davis
In Washington v. Davis,187 the Court defined the equal protection
clause. "Disproportionate impact is not irrelevant, but it is not the sole
touchstone of an invidious racial discrimination forbidden by the
Constitution."' 8 The Court distinguished the Title VII standard from the
equal protection clause standard:
[Title VII] involves a more probing judicial review of, and less deference to,
the seemingly reasonable acts of administrators and executives than is
appropriate under the Constitution where special racial impact, without
discriminatory purpose, is claimed. We are not disposed to adopt this more
180. 384 U.S. at 669 (Harlan, J., dissenting). But cf. Cox, Foreword: Constitutional
Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 84 HARV. L. REv. 91,105 (1966) ("No case has ever
held that a [legislative] record is constitutionally required ... " The reason for not requiring such a
record is that "the fundamental basis for legislative action is the knowledge, experience, andjudgment
of the people's representatives only a small part, or even none, of which may come from the hearings
and reports of committees or debates upon the floor.") (footnote omitted). Justice Harlan has the better
of any argument that demands deference to legislative action only when some record is established.
181. 384 U.S. at 652.
182. Id. at 654.
183. Id. at 653, 656.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 668.
186. For this reason, the argument in City of Rome v. United States, 100 S. Ct. 1548, 1561-62
(1980). that Congress has enforcement power independent of the meaning of the provision being
enforced is a bit off. What really happened in the cases cited was legislative acceptance of an invitation
to fill the void identified by the Court as necessary to show a violation other than what the provision
proscribed by its own force.
187. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
188. Id. at 248.
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rigorous standard for the purposes of applying the Fifth and the Fourteenth
Amendments in cases such as this.189
After Washington v. Davis, state and local government employers could
claim constitutional immunity from a charged violation of the equal
protection clause that relied "solely" on discriminatory impact evidence.
After Lassiter, states with literacy tests could claim constitutional
immunity from a charged violation of the equal protection clause that
relied solely on a facial argument. In both cases, the Constitution was
defined. Had Congress enacted the Voting Rights Act without accepting
the Lassiter invitation, section 5 would not have been a sufficient
constitutional anchor. For the same reason, had Congress enacted Title
VII without honoring the Washington v. Davis definitional limits, section
5 would not have been a sufficient constitutional anchor.
The language in Washington v. Davis surely approves, if only in dicta,
the Title VII discriminatory impact standard for public employers.' 90 That
approval does not, however, extend to the source for the standard in Title
VII. Washington v. Davis does not approve the discriminatory impact
standard as an exercise of section 5 or commerce clause power.
3. The Fourteenth Amendment
Section 5 expressly grants Congress power only to enforce the
provisions of the fourteenth amendment. Twelve years after adoption of
the fourteenth amendment, the Court held that Congress had been
empowered to enact "[w]hatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adopted
to carry out the objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to
enforce submission to the prohibitions they contain."'9' That power was
not absolute; the fourteenth amendment, while a reaction to a Civil War in
which states acted irresponsibly toward the federation, was not intended to
overhaul federalism totally. Perhaps from some sense that Congress too
might act irresponsibly in the future, the victorious states were hardly so
humble that they would yield to congressional powers that intruded upon
the minimal restraints of federalism. 192 The fourteenth amendment was
not "intended to strip the States of their power, carefully preserved in the
original Constitution, to govern themselves."'193 Though broad, the
fourteenth amendment has limits:
189. Id. at 247-48.
190. Id. at 248 ("[E]xtension of the rule [of disparate impact] beyond those areas where it is
already applicable by reason of statute, such as in the field of public employment should await
legislative prescription.').
191. Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1880).
192. The fourteenth amendment certainly centralized "civil rights authority in the federal
government," Greesman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323,
1329 (1952), but the operating force was hubris, not humility. See Bickel, The Original Understanding
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 36-37 (1955) (Representatives from New York
argued from the "proud position" that the South should learn from the North how to protect civil
rights.)
193. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 127 (1970) (Black, J., separate opinion). But see
Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REv. 1323, 1323(1952)("The
states' rights doctrine suffered a complete albeit temporary eclipse.")
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Nothing is clearer about the history of the Fourteenth Amendment than that
its framers rejected the option of an open-ended grant of power to Congress
to meddle with conditions within the states so as to render them equal in
accordance with its own notions. . . . Hence the power of Congress comes
into play only when the pre-condition of a denial of equal protection of the
laws by a state has been met.19
4
4. Burden of Proof under Title VII
Congressional adjustments of burdens of proof are fine if done within
congressional power. A burden of proof, however, is more than just a
formal technique of persuasion. "Although such words as 'standard of
proof' and 'prima facie case' refer to procedural and evidentiary issues,
they also strike at the substantive heart of" constitutional and statutory
proscriptions.'95
In Vance v. Terrazas,196 the Court used a definition/application
dichotomy for determining congressional power to enact a burden of proof
different from one adopted by a prior Court decision. The Court had
interpreted the fourteenth amendment to require that an "intent to
relinquish citizenship, whether the intent is expressed in words or is found
as a fair inference from proven conduct" be shown before Congress
stripped a person of citizenship. 197 That holding parallels Washington v.
Davis. A later decision, based on the Immigration and Naturalization Act
of 1952 and "not rooted in the Constitution," held that the burden of proof
was a "clear, convincing, and unequivocal" showing of the requisite
intent.'" That holding parallels Lassitter. Congress "took direct aim" at
that holding and amended the Act to allow a rebuttable presumption of the
voluntariness of acts inconsistent with citizenship, which presumption
operated to create "rules of evidence under which the burden of proof to
establish loss of citizenship by preponderance of the evidence would rest
upon the Government."'199 That amendment parallels the Voting Rights
Act.
The Court upheld the amendment: "[S]ince Congress has the express
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, it is untenable to hold that it
has no power whatsoever to address itself to the manner or means by which
Fourteenth Amendment citizenship may be relinquished., 200 The Court
distinguished its earlier constitutional holding2 ' that conditioned
expatriation on intent from its earlier statutory holding202 that, in effect,
194. Bickel. The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 Sup. CT. REv. 79, 97.
195. Heiser, Intent v. Impact: The Standard of Proof Necessary to Establish a Prima Facie Case
of Race Discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 16 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 208 n.9 (1979).
196. 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980).
197. Id. at 545. referring to Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 257 (1967).
198. Nishikawa v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 129, 138 (1958).
199. Vance v. Terrazas. 100 S. Ct. at 547 & n.8, citing H. R. REP. No. 1086,87th Cong., 1st Sess.
41. reprinted in [1961] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEVS 2985.
200. 100 S. Ct. at 548.
201. See note 197 and accompanying text, supra.
202. See note 198 and accompanying text, supra.
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usurped the "traditional powers of Congress to prescribe rules of evidence
and standards of proof in the federal courts. '203 As in Morgan, the Court
deferred to a "congressional judgment . . . that the preponderance
standard of proof provides sufficient protection for the interest of the
individual in retaining his citizenship. 20 Yet the Court had not budged on
the constitutionally imposed intent requirement; instead it used the
requirement as a counterbalance to the lowered evidentiary burden. Either
intent is not an evidentiary standard (an unlikely proposition) or the
constitutional definition blocked any inconsistent congressional one.
In dissent, Justice Marshall objected to the preponderance standard
205because an aspect of liberty was implicated. His description of
congressional power under section 5 is revealing. He believed that the
congressionally established burden of proof was "the beginning, not the
end, of the inquiry. It remains the task of this Court to determine when
those rules and standards impinge on constitutional rights. 20 6 Again, this
argument parallels Morgan. Justice Marshall would have given less
deference to Congress because a review for minimum rationality is
inappropriate when a liberty interest is affected. He and the majority
agreed, however, that when Congress acts pursuant to section 5, it gains no
greater power by labeling the act a mere procedural or evidentiary one.
The distinguishing characteristic is whether a substantive con-
stitutional guarantee is affected by the procedural or evidentiary rule.20 7
The substantive guarantee of equal protection is affected by the Title VII
standard. State and local employers lose their constitutional immunity
from being found in violation of the equal protection clause for
discriminatory impact practices alone. The burden of proof in actuality
reverses the Washington v. Davis definition of the equal protection clause
because it adds to "the basic equal protection principle '203 of dis-
criminatory purpose a second principle of discriminatory impact. That is
more than an adjustment; it is an amendment. Congress is not empowered
by section 5 to amend the fourteenth amendment, whether directly or by
tinkering with the burden of proof. Title VII is likewise restricted.
D. Renewing the Challenge
The attraction of section 5 as a constitutional anchor for imposing
discriminatory impact statutory liability on state and local government
203. 100 S. Ct. at 548.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 550-51 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
206. Id. at 551 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
207. Outcome-determinativeness is hardly talismanic. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-67
(1965). Nonetheless, the analysis in Vance v. Terrazas, 100 S. Ct. 540 (1980), parallels that suggested:
the critical question is whether the constitutional guarantee is equally well served by the legislation. Cf.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966) (Congress and the States may substitute procedures so
long as the substantive right is protected.)
208. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229. 240 (1976).
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employers is the detour around the roadblocks of the tenth and eleventh
amendments. Title VII was able to avoid blithely those roadblocks in
Fitzpatrick.°9 Section 5 is "one section of a constitutional Amendment
whose other sections by their own terms embody limitations on state
authority., 2t0 Decided four days after National League and authored by
the same justice,2 tt Fitzpatrick suggested the shortcut of section 5; but, if
section 5 is not an adequate constitutional anchor for discriminatory
impact liability, the shortcut truly does become a dead end.
212National League struck down a congressional effort to regulate
state and local government wage and overtime practices. The effort was
anchored in the commerce clause. The Court recognized that "[ilt is
established beyond peradventure that the Commerce Clause of Art. I of
the Constitution is a grant of plenary authority of Congress.21 3 The tenth
amendment, however, was a bar to the congressional effort:
We have repeatedly recognized that there are attributes of sovereignty
attaching to every state government which may not be impaired by Congress,
not because Congress may lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to
reach the matter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the
authority in that manner.214
The state and local government challenges to the Title VII
discriminatory impact standard assert that "attributes of sovereignty" are
"impaired" by the standard. Since courts and commentators invariably
reject the challenge to section 5 power, this renewed challenge has not been
studied seriously. The challenge has been rejected, however, when made
against the Equal Pay Act, though most discussion, again, has been
focused on section 5 power.21 5
The challenge was stated succinctly in a petition for certiorari:
(1) Does Title VII of 1964 Civil Rights Act require local government to
change manner in which job of police officer is performed (i.e., providing for
use of greater force, such as baton or nightstick, rather than for some
physically demanding hand control holds in effectuating arrest) merely
because those different policies would permit selection standards having less
'adverse impact' upon women as class, or does Act and/or constitutional
concepts of federalism permit local government to establish law enforcement
209. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
210. Id.
211. Justice Rehnquist may well have been laying the groundwork for a chance at "writing on a
clean slate" about section 5 and title VII. See Shapiro, Mr. Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View, 90
HARV. L. REv. 293. 304-05 (1976).
212. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 851 (1976).
213. Id. at 840.
214. Id. at 845.
215. See, e.g., Pearce v. Wichita Cty. Hosp. Bd., 590 F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1979) (commerce);
Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 3 (7th Cir. 1979) (commerce); Ruffin v. County of Los
Angeles, 607 F.2d 1276, 1282 & n.3 (9th Cir. 1979) (both commerce and section 5); Comment, Applying
the Equal Pay Act to State and Local Governments: The Effect of National League of Cities v. Usery,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 677 (1977) (section 5).
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policies and to select most qualified candidates to perform tasks required by
those policies?
16
The challenge reemphasizes the traditional local nature of employment
decisions; particularly those, like civil service examinations, that are
regular targets for the disparate impact standard. These decisions often
involve employers in traditional government services, like police and fire
departments. 17 The argument is that "[i]f Congress cannot prescribe the
wages and hours of public employees, including [inter alia] school
employees, it cannot prescribe how public school districts [inter alia] must
go about hiring and promoting their employees. 2 18 While National
League involved a congressionally imposed substantial increase in
expenditures, the costs of compliance were derived from the interference
with government operations, and the discriminatory impact standard of
Title VII similarly interferes.219
E. Meeting the Renewed Challenge
As the legislative history of the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
reflects, Congress amended Title VII pursuant to both the fourteenth
amendment and the commerce clause. 220 The interpretation of the
commerce clause heavily relied on by Congress was the Supreme Court
decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 221 which had partially extended the Fair
Labor Standards Act to state and local government employers. That
decision was overruled in National League.222 An interim decision, Fry v.
United States, however, remained relatively unscathed. Fry upheld the
Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,224 which imposed a temporary freeze
on the wages of state and local government employees. Fry was
distinguished from National League on five grounds: (1) the Economic
216. Petition for Certiorari, Blake v. City of Los Angeles, 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. Apr. 28, 1980) 48 U.S.L.W. 3125 (1979).
217. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of City of San Francisco 10-12, County of Los Angeles v.
Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), reprinted in 12 Sup. Ct. L. Reprints (Lab. Ser.) No. 6A at 358-60 (1978).
The United States Civil Rights Commission indicates in FOR ALL THE PEOPLE . . . By ALL THE
PEOPLE: A REPORT ON EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT (1969).
"that each community in this country faces special and unique problems; and, indeed, the report notes
many instances wherein state and local governments had made substantial progress in the area of
equalization of employment opportunities." Id. at 32-33, 12 Sup. Ct. L. Reprints at 380-81.
218. Brief for Petitioners 12-13, Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977),
reprinted in 10 Sup. Ct. L. Reprints (Lab. Ser.) No. 21 at 58-59 (1977).
219. Cf. Note, Federalism and Federal Regulation of Public Employers: The Implications of
National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 CLEVE. ST. L. REV. 259, 289 (1977) (The Equal Pay Act involves
structuring wages, and any commerce clause anchor is thus controlled by National League of Cities.);
Marshall v. Owensboro-Daviess Cty. Hosp., 581 F.2d 116, 119 n.3 (6th Cir. 1978) (Regarding wage
differentials, the"seemingly definite and inflexible language of the Supreme Court is National League
of Cities" appears to prohibit the Equal Pay Act.).
220. See notes 78-102 and accompanying text, supra.
221. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
222. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1976).
223. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
224. Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II, 84 Stat. 799 (1970) (expired 1974).
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Stabilization Act was a temporary measure in an emergency period; (2) the
emergency was an extremely serious problem, that of "severe inflation that
threatened the national economy"; (3) the means selected were narrowly
tailored to least "interfere with the States' freedom"; (4) the Act "displaced
no state choices as to how governmental operations should be structured,
nor did it force the States to remake such choices themselves"; and (5) the
Act "operated to reduce the pressures upon state budgets rather than
increase them. 225
These distinctions led Justice Blackmun to concur, an important vote
because only four justices joined the majority, and his one paragraph
opinion vacillates between agreement with the majority and the dissent.
The "understanding on my part" that allowed him to join the majority
opinion was that "it seems to me that it adopts a balancing approach, and
does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmental protection,
where the federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility
compliance with imposed federal standards could be essential., 226 The
temporary wage freeze upheld in Fry would have had its "effectiveness
drastically impaired if it were inapplicable to state and local government
employers., 227 Thus, the importance of the federal interest and the impact
of state and local government nonadherence to that interest become
balancing criteria.
Title VII fares well under these standards. "Title VII intrudes less than
minimum wage legislation on the role of state and local governments,
places a less stringent financial burden on them, and reflects a more
important national purpose-that of ending discrimination., 22' Nor does
the impact of Title VII on state and local governments "impair their ability
to function effectively in a federal system., 229 Title VII "leaves the States
free to set all substantive terms of employment"230 except one:
discrimination. The ability to discriminate, even if "only" by dis-
criminatory impact practices, is hardly essential for state and local
governments to maintain the "separate and independent existence"
protected in National League.231 Congress' finding of an impact on
interstate commerce surely is sufficiently based in fact and precedent to
withstand judicial scrutiny.23 2 Title VII "does not displace any State
policies regarding the manner in which a State may structure delivery of its
225. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852-53.
226. Id. at 856.
227. Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1084 (5th Cir. 1979).
228. Scott v. City ofAnniston, Ala., 597 F.2d 897,900 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W.
3698 (U.S. Apr. 28, 1980).
229. Id., quoting Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975).
230. Pearce v. Wichita Cty. Hosp. Bd., 590 F.2d 128, 132 (5th Cir. 1979).
231. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 851, quoting Coylev. Oklahoma, 221 U.S.
559, 580 (1911).
232. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 120-22 (1941) (Congress may make policy
choices and choose rational means); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241,258
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services., 233 Any interference from Title VII differs in kind, not merely
degree, from that in National League. This desire to avoid interfering with
state and local governments was also evidenced in Senate floor debate on
the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972.234 However expensive
their compliance with Title VII, state and local governments will not likely
be able to produce evidence of the need for a tax increase or massive
layoffs, the results claimed in National League.
Title VII does not satisfy all the National League standards.
Moreover, while commerce clause power extends to purely local activity
that affects interstate commerce, the nature of the activity remains a factor
in the balance.235 The unfortunate fact is that Title VII was neither
(1964) (power to regulate over any local activities that have a "substantial and harmful effect upon"
interstate commerce). The magnitude of state and local government employment forces, see notes 54-
55 and accompanying text, supra, and the societal and economic impact of discrimination in those
forces, see notes 87-88 and accompanying text, supra, were of concern to Congress in enacting the 1972
amendments to Title VII. Cf Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 1577 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1979) ("IThe
Equal Pay Act was based upon a congressional adverse impact on interstate commerce."). H.R. RE'.
No. 95-948,95th Cong. 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE & AD. Nhws 4760 (1978) ("Because this
bill [prohibiting pregnancy-related discrimination under Title VII] will encourage women to remain in
the work force during and after pregnancy, it should operate to reduce employee replacement,
retraining and unemployment compensation costs while increasing labor market stability and
productivity.")
233. Marshall v. City of Sheboygan, 577 F.2d 1, 6 (7th Cir. 1979), referring to National League
of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 847 (1976). Cf Peel v. Florida Dep't of Transp., 600 F.2d 1010, 1083
(5th Cir. 1979) (no "serious financial strains" arise from a federal veteran's assistance law); Friends of
the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977) ("The impact of
enforcement [of environmental laws], to the contrary, can be expected merely to involve the use of
existing structures and personnel. ... ).
234. 118 CONG. REC. 1816 (1972) (Sen. Williams) ("The means employed by this bill authorize
minimal contacts between the Federal Government and State and local governments; public employers
will be able to hire whomever they please, so long as it is done in a non-discriminatory manner.")
235. See, e.g., Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 440 (1978). "Our recent
decisions make clear that the inquiry necessarily involves a sensitive consideration of the weight and
nature of the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden imposed on the course of
interstate commerce." Id. at 441. Accord, Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
Employment decisions are local in nature even though their impact may have interstate repercussions.
United States v. Karby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941) (minimum wage and maximum hours regulation of
intrastate labor producing for interstate market). The only distinction between National League of
Cities and Darby is that "in NLC the state is, whereas in Darby it is not, affected in its capacity as an
agent pursuing particular interests" and not as a legislature rendering policy choices. Michelman,
States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of'Sovereignty'in National League of Cities v. Usery,
86 YALE L.J. 1165, 1168 n. 15 (1977). That distinction is not, however, critical. The separate existence of
states is threatened as much by infringement on legislative choices made pursuant to the sovereign's
police power as by intrusion in employment decisions. Indeed, not only is the kind of invasion of states'
rights similar, but the degree may even be more severe when legislative choices are infringed. Telling a
state whom to employ for how many hours and how much compensation is less obnoxious to
sovereignty than telling the state what the employee may substantively do.
National League focuses on evidence that legislative choices would be displaced as a direct result
of minimum wage and maximum hours legislation. 426 U.S. at 846-48. Those choices are normally
worth deferring to due to "the greater sensitivity of local officials to preference of citizens and the costs
of achieving [governmental] goals in a given locality, the diffusion of governmental power and the
promotion of cultural and social diversity; and the enhancement of individual participation in and
identification of governmental decision-making." Stewart, Pryamids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196,
1231 (1977). One extrapolation from National League turned on the states' inability to provide basic
services due to the fiscal impact of imposed employment practices, "protected expectations" about
receiving those services arise. Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The New Federalism and
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intended to be nor will be in the predictable future but a temporary
measure.236 It is, nonetheless, a measure of some emergency, long overdue
in its extension to state and local governments, that serves an
overwhelming federal interest.237 The number of state and local employees
renders any federal objective of equal employment opportunity unat-
tainable unless those employees are protected.238 Regardless of the manner
in which the fourteenth amendment was construed in Washington v.
Davis, its text, history, and values establish a federal commitment to equal
Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (1977). Even if
these affirmative readings of National League are fair readings, rather than hopeful prophecies, Title
VII would not conflict because the restructuring there found by the Supreme Court to result from
federal legislation would be negligible under Title VII. Beyond that, were Title VII challenged as an
assault on sovereignty, thejudiciary should yield to a "congressional determination" on the impact of
the assault. Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the
Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLuUM. L. REv. 543,558-59 (1954) ("'he
national political process in the United States-and especially the role of the states in the composition
and selection of the central government-is intrinsically well adapted to retarding or restraining new
intrusions by the center on the domain of the states.")
236. What is "temporary" for Title VII purposes may differ from the lay sense of the term. In
Steelworkers v. Weber, 99 S. Ct. 2721, 2730 (1979), the Court approved a training program with a
racial quota because "the plan is a temporary measure; it is not intended to maintain racial balance, but
simply to eliminate a manifest racial imbalance." Based on employee turnover and current size of the
program, however, the quota would last 15 years before the goal set for eliminating an imbalance were
reached. Although not temporary in a temporal sense, the program is temporary in nature because it
sets a goal that marks the conclusion of the quota. Modification of employment practices to avoid
discriminatory impact, for example, eliminating height and weight requirements, is temporary in the
same sense: only so long as men and women (and some ethnic groups) markedly differ in height and
weight will the practice be modified. Temporary in this sense is much like permanent. Certainly, Title
VII differs from a temporary wage-price freeze; but, of all the factors derived from National League,
the duration of the intrusion seems least important. Were the intrusion of sufficient magnitude, its
duration would be only a matter of degree that made no difference in kind. Cf. U. S. Trust Co. v. New
Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22 n.19 (1977) (Concerning the impairment of contracts, "[u]ndoubtedly the
existence of an emergency and the limited .duration of a relief measure are factors to be assessed in
determining the reasonableness of an impairment, but they cannot be regarded as essential in every
case.")
237. The precise federal interest served by discriminatory impact liability for state and local
government employers is the same as that for private employers: elimination of barriers to equal
participation in the economic system. The Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971),
interpretation of Title VII to include impact discrimination was necessary to reach "practices that are
fair in form, but discriminatory in operation." To that end, "Congress has now required that the
posture and condition of the job-seeker be taken into account," and that employers remove "artifial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classification." Id. "This effort [in Griggs to
redefine discrimination] was, without doubt, crucial. The traditional definitions of discrimination
permitted the employer to translate the unfair treatment of minorities in other segments of society into
a limitation on employment opportunities." Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise: GRIGGS V DUKE POWER
Co. and the Concept of Employment Discrimination, 71 Mich. L. REV. 59. 69 (1972). Criticizing
National League, Professor Tribe argues that federal rights-based legislation should receive more
deference: "the crucial point is that a necessarily over-inclusive protection of human rights should not
serve to paralyze Congress in the face of overriding national problems." Tribe, Unraveling National
League of Cities: The Nest, Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services," 90
HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1099 (1977). See Regeants of the University of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,387-98
(1978) (Marshall, J., separate opinion). And, "[i]t is now clear that, however important the Court may
view the theoretical autonomy of state governments, it does not intend to promote that value at the
expense of the federal government's capacity to vindicate individual civil liberties protected by the
Federal Constitution." Ripple & Kenyon, State Sovereignty - A Polished But Slippery Crown, 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 745, 773 (1979).
238. See notes 53-57, 79, 82-84.
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employment opportunity, a commitment imposed upon the states by an
amendment that decreased their sovereignty.219 Congress had sufficient
evidence before it to determine that discriminatory impact practices were
equally, if not surpassingly, pervasive problems compared with dis-
criminatory purpose practices. 240 Title VII could not more narrowly tailor
its standard by extending only a discriminatory purpose standard because
discriminatory impact practices were (and are, in the author's experience)
so pervasive. Absent a showing that the structure or budget of government
239. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); See notes 72-74 and accompanying text,
supra. It is not circular to use the fourteenth amendment as a weight in a commerce clause balancing
test while eschewing the force of the amendment by itself to impose discriminatory impact liability. The
effect of the fourteenth amendment on states' rights is structural; the extent of that effect is interpretive.
Before its adoption, "the Civil War had irrevocably and profoundly altered the balance of power
between Federal and State Governments." Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 364 (1979) (Brennan, Jr.,
concurring).
In the eleventh amendment context, had Congress enacted the 1972 amendments to Title VII
solely as an exercise of section 5 power under the fourteenth amendment, the legislation would have
"abrogated any existing immunity of the states from liability for discriminatory employment
practices." Shawer v. Indiana U., 602 F.2d 1161, 1164(3rd Cir. 1979) (per curiam). That power permits
Congress to "provide for private suits against States or State officials which are constitutionally
impermissible in other contexts." Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at 456. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 693-94 (1978). Thus, there must be "the threshold fact of congressional authorization to sue a
class of defendants which literally includes States." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 672-73 (1974).
The problem as to state governments is that a Title VII limited to its section 5 power base would be
stuck with the Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976), definition of the discrimination
proscribed by the equal protection clause. See notes 105-94 and accompanying text, supra. As to local
governments, immunity is vitiated by the holding in Monell v. New York City Dep't of Social Serv., 436
U.S. 658, 690 (1978) (municipalities are not part of the state for eleventh amendment purposes).
To resolve the problem as to state governments, resort is taken to the commerce clause; yet,
Fitzpatrick suggests an anchor solely in that clause would be inadequate. 427 U.S. at 452-53. But, the
eleventh amendment does not extend to injunctive relief against state officials. Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. 123, 159-60 (1880). Whatever financial impact injunctive relief might have would not be an
"enormous fiscal" burden, Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 697 n.27, and would be "ancillary to the
prospective relief." Quern v. Jordan 440 U.S. at 349. Moreover, the commerce clause is one of the
enumerated powers that the states ceded to the federal government. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. at
457-58 (Brennan, J., concurring) (referring to his dissenting opinions in Employees v. Missouri Pub.
Health Dep't, 411 U.S. 279, 319 (1973) and Edelman v. Jordon, 415 U.S. at 687), There is no greater
enumeration of power on the face of section 5 than in the combination of the necessary and properand
commerce clauses. Also, in both Employees v. Mo. Pub. Health Dep't, 411 U.S. at 283-85, and Parden
v. Terminal R., 337 U.S. 184, 190-92 (1964), the Court recognized that the commerce clause would be a
sufficient anchor to overcome immunity. Employees did refer, 411 U.S. at 283, to Maryland v. Wirtz,
392 U.S. 183 (1968), now overruled by National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,855 (1971), but
the reference was not to eleventh amendment immunity, and National League in leaving at least some
commerce clause power for federal regulation of state enterprises notably approved of Parden. 426
U.S. at 854 n. 18 (the Parden holding in "unimpaired"). In light of the legislative"history which focuses
directly on the question of state liability and which shows that Congress considered and firmly decided
to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the States." Title VII would abrogate Quern v.
Jordon, 440 U.S. at 345. In the tenth amendment context, National League also accepted the concept
that federal interests may outweigh those of the state. 426 U.S. at 854 n. 18 (citing approvingly Case v.
Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946), and stating that a claim of immunity may be rejected if"it would
impermissibly 'impair a prime purpose of the Federal Government's establishment' "). This approach
produces the balancing test Justice Blackmun desires. Courts must "assess and weigh the source of the
congressional power and the legitimacy of its exercise against the degree to which it interferes with
integral governmental functions of the states and political subdivisions." Peel v. Florida Dep't of
Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1083 (5th Cir. 1979). In that balancing, "no automatic displacement of federal
power would follow a finding that the exercise of such power reached into areas of traditional state
governmental functions." Ripple & Kenyon, State Sovereigitty-A Polished But Slipperi' Crown, 54
NOTRE DAME LAW. 745, 748 (1979).
240. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text, supra.
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operations is seriously affected, Title VII should still win on balance.24'
The challengers' argument that Title VII would change the way a job is
performed ignores the business necessity defense to discriminatory
impact. 242 "Since Title VII prohibits only selection practices which are not
job related, compliance will not interfere with any legitimate state or local
policies or practices and will contribute significantly to the efficacy of their
personnel methods.
243
On balance, Title VII should meet with the same success as the Equal
Pay Act in satisfying the tenth amendment limit on the commerce clause.
Federalism does demand respect for state and local government
operations. Nevertheless, reciprocal respect for federal interests must be
shown. The National League standards accommodate the respect due each
part of the federalist system. Title VII is a fair accommodation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Discriminatory impact statutory liability for the employment
practices of state and local governments must satisfy the same rigorous
challenges as other laws.244 By not facing those challenges squarely, courts
and commentators may lull proponents into a false sense of constitutional
security.245 The route to a solid constitutional anchor may well pass
through City of Rome; but, as with the original empire, all roads also lead
elsewhere.
In American jurisprudence, precedent is seldom quickly and never
241. In National League remand, sub nom. National League of Cities v. Marshall, 429 F. Supp.
703, 705 (D. D. C. 1977), the trial court allowed the federal legislation to apply to employees not
"engaged in activities integral to and traditionally provided by government." Even as to those core
functions, the teaching of National League is only that "Congress must . . . be prevented from acting
in ways that would leave a state formally intact but functionally a gutted shell." Tribe, Unraveling
National League of Cities. The New Federalism and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government
Services, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (1977). Applying discriminatory impact standards to state and
local governments cannot fairly be characterized as a gutting force. To the contrary, the traditional
limit on commerce clause power is that it "may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them in view of our complex society would
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government." NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937). Thelegislative
findings of an impact upon commerce from state and local employment practices counters any
argument that the effects are to indirect and remote.
242. See note 45 and accompanying text, supra.
243. Brief Amicus Curiae for the NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, Inc. 23, Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977), reprinted in 10 Sup. Ct. L. Reprints (Lab. Ser.) No. 21
at 345 (1976).
244. "[Ulnlike the wage and hour provisions, the Equal Pay Act sets no substantive terms of
employment. The states remain free to set . . . all other terms and conditions of employment as they
see fit, as long as they do not do so in a discriminatory fashion. . . . [S]ex discrimination in
employment is neither an exercise of discretion essential to state sovereignty nor an undoubted
attribute of such sovereignty." Comment, Applying the Equal Pay Act to State and Local
Governments: The Effects of National League of Cities v. Usery, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 665, 670 (1977)
(footnotes omitted). See also Note, Federalism and Federal Regulation of Public Employers: The
Implications of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 259, 292 (1977).
245. After this Article was completed, the Supreme Court refused to entertain two challenges to
application of discriminatory impact standards to local government employers. Blake v. City of Los
Angeles. 595 F.2d 1367 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. Apr. 28, 1980); Scott v.
1980]
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lightly ignored; instead, an evolutionary line of holdings nibbles away at
the target until, underpinnings weakened, the precedent collapses. To
forewarn of such demise is at worst paranoia and at best soothsaying. This
Article, then, has been built on a combination of fear and prophecy.
The fear is that through a line of decisions culminating in Fitzpatrick,
Washington v. Davis, and National League, a number of Supreme Court
Justices have sandbagged the full extension of Title VII to public
employers. The prophecy is that clear analysis will make the fear
groundless.
City of Anniston, Ala. 597 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 48 U.S.L.W. 3698 (U.S. April 28,
1980). A state employer was not involved in either case. Thus, the challenges will continue as to state
employers and, despite the certiorari denial, probably as to local employers. Divining what the
certiorari denial means is speculation; however, the three-judge panels in the two circuits were not in
conflict. Justice Jackson had perhaps the definitive statement on the effect of certiorari denials: "The
Court is not quite of one mind on the subject. Some say denial means nothing, others say it means
nothing much. Realistically, the first position is untenable and the second is unintelligible" Brown v.
Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 542 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in result).
